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This thesis is concerned with the ad hoc coordination problem. Therein, the goal is
to design an autonomous agent which can achieve high flexibility and efficiency in a
multiagent system that admits no prior coordination between the designed agent and
the other agents. Flexibility describes the agent’s ability to solve its task with a variety
of other agents in the system; efficiency is the relation between the agent’s payoffs and
time needed to solve the task; and no prior coordination means that the agent does not
a priori know how the other agents behave. This problem is relevant for a number of
practical applications, including human-machine interaction tasks, such as adaptive user
interfaces, robotic elderly care, and automated trading agents.
Motivated by this problem, the central idea studied in this thesis is to utilise a set of
policies, or types, to characterise the behaviour of other agents. Specifically, the idea is
to reduce the complexity of the interaction problem by assuming that the other agents
draw their latent type from some known or hypothesised space of types, and that the
assignment of types is governed by an unknown distribution. Based on the current
interaction history, we can form posterior beliefs about the relative likelihood of types.
These beliefs, combined with the future predictions of the types, can then be used in a
planning procedure to compute optimal responses. The aim of this thesis is to study the
potential and limitations of this idea in the context of ad hoc coordination.
We formulate the ad hoc coordination problem using a game-theoretic model called
the stochastic Bayesian game. Based on this model, we derive a canonical algorithmic
description of the idea outlined above, called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination
(HBA). The practical potential of HBA is demonstrated in two case studies, including a
human-machine experiment and a simulated logistics domain. We formulate basic ways
to incorporate evidence (i.e. observed actions) into posterior beliefs and analyse the
conditions under which the posterior beliefs converge to the true distribution of types.
Furthermore, we study the impact of prior beliefs over types (that is, before any actions
are observed) on the long-term performance of HBA, and show empirically that au-
tomatic methods can compute prior beliefs with consistent performance effects. For
hypothesised (i.e. “guessed”) type spaces, we analyse the relations between hypothe-
sised and true type spaces under which HBA is still guaranteed to solve its task, despite
inaccuracies in hypothesised types. Finally, we show how HBA can perform an auto-
matic statistical analysis to decide whether to reject its behavioural hypothesis, i.e. the




Assume a machine has to interact with some human (or other machine) on a given task
to achieve some goal. To be successful in this setting, the machine should account for
the following three aspects: (1) different humans may have different behaviours for the
given task, (2) humans typically have little patience when interacting with machines,
and (3) the machine may not know ahead of time how the human behaves. Therefore,
the machine should be able to learn quickly how to interact effectively with humans
whose behaviours are initially unknown. We refer to these kinds of problems as ad hoc
coordination problems.
One way to deal with such a situation is sometimes referred to as “pigeon-holing”.
In it, we guess several potential behaviours (e.g. from past experience) that the human
could have, and compare the predictions of these behaviours with the actions taken by
the human. We can then plan our own actions with respect to those guessed behaviours
which we believe are most likely, based on the human’s observed actions. In this thesis,
we essentially study machines that use this kind of reasoning.
Specifically, we use a mathematical model called the stochastic Bayesian game to
formalise the interaction problem. Based on this model, we define an algorithm, called
Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA), which corresponds to the pigeon-
holing reasoning outlined above. The practical potential of HBA is demonstrated in
experiments involving humans as well as other machines. Furthermore, we analyse the
conditions under which HBA’s beliefs about the likelihood of behaviours will eventually
be correct, and we also study the impact of initial beliefs (similar to “anticipation” or
“prejudice”) on the long-term performance of HBA. For guessed behaviours, we study
the theoretical conditions under which HBA can solve its task even when the guessed
behaviours are incorrect, and we show how HBA can itself decide whether or not to
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This thesis is concerned with ad hoc coordination in multiagent systems. Therein, the
goal is to design an autonomous agent which is able to achieve high flexibility and
efficiency in a multiagent system that admits no prior coordination between the designed
agent and the other agents. Flexibility describes the agent’s ability to solve its task with
a variety of other agents in the system; efficiency is the relation between the agent’s
payoffs and time needed to solve the task; and no prior coordination means that the
agent does not a priori know how the other agents behave. In particular, there is no
prior coordination of behaviours in terms of predefined action protocols, shared world
models, explicit communication of beliefs, etc.
This problem is relevant for a number of important applications. For example,
consider an adaptive user interface which interacts with a user to complete a certain task.
Depending on the complexity of the task, the user may exhibit a variety of different
behaviours and the interface should be flexible enough to accommodate such a variety.
Furthermore, the user typically has little patience for lengthy learning periods based
on trial and error, hence the interface should quickly learn what the user intends to do
and how to assist the user adequately. Finally, unless the user is already trained with
the interface and can be identified during the interaction, the interface will typically not
know a priori how the user behaves.
The characterisation of flexibility, efficiency, and no prior coordination is shared
more generally by many human-machine interaction problems. Another example in
this category is given by robotic elderly care, in which a mobile robot is used to assist
residents of an elderly home to accomplish their daily tasks. Again, the residents may
have a variety of behaviours for a given task, which the robot should account for by
being flexible in its interaction. Moreover, given that a single robot may be used to
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assist a larger group of residents, there may be little time for extensive learning trials,
hence efficient interaction is required. Finally, unless the robot has access to behavioural
profiles for each resident, it may not know how the residents behave and assumptions
regarding prior knowledge and communication can be problematic.
As a final example in which ad hoc coordination arises naturally, consider an elec-
tronic trading market where a collective of trading agents exchange resources. A task
in this setting could be to acquire a specific amount of a certain commodity, subject to
constraints about prices and time. To be successful, a trading agent should be able to
interact with other agents who may exhibit a range of different trading strategies. In
addition, given that time is usually an important constraint, the agent should be able
to find an efficient trade-off between time needed to accomplish its task and trade ex-
penses. Finally, prior coordination of behaviours may not be desirable (e.g. agents do
not want others to know their strategy) or even allowed (e.g. market laws may forbid
certain kinds of prior coordination between market participants).
Unfortunately, current methods for multiagent interaction are not suitable for ad
hoc coordination, due to a number of limitations. For example, many methods have
been designed in the context of homogeneous systems, in which all agents use the same
algorithm (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012). This significantly reduces the flexibility
of such methods, and it can be viewed as a strong form of prior coordination. Some
methods attempt to learn models of other agents based on past observations. However,
such methods typically require long learning periods in order to produce reliable models,
and the models themselves may be based on restrictive assumptions. The former reduces
the efficiency of such methods while the latter reduces their flexibility. Therefore, what
is needed is an agent that can quickly learn to interact effectively with a variety of other
agents, yet without knowing a priori how they behave.
A related problem is known in game theory as the incomplete information game.
Therein, each player has some “private” information which is relevant to the decision
making of the player. This information may pertain to any structural aspects of the game,
such as payoff functions, strategy spaces, etc. The fact that this private information is
unknown to the other players means that here, likewise, players have to interact with
other players whose behaviours are unknown. Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) proposed to
reduce the complexity of this problem by assuming that the private information, or type,
of each player is drawn from some space of types, and that the assignment of types is
governed by a probability distribution over this space. This transformation gives rise
to what is now commonly known as a Bayesian game, and much research has been
3
devoted to the study of learning and equilibria in such games.
Can we, similarly, reduce the complexity of ad hoc coordination problems by assum-
ing that the other agents draw their unknown behaviours, or types1, from some space of
types? Of course, game theorists are primarily interested in equilibrium attainment, in
which a collective of players play in some sense optimally against each other. In con-
trast, our interest is in the flexibility and efficiency of an individual agent, which do not
require an equilibrium concept. Furthermore, the normative assumptions of concepts
such as the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950), including perfect rationality with respect to
one’s utilities, may be difficult to justify in ad hoc coordination in which we assume
that the behaviour of other agents is a priori unknown. Nonetheless, the idea of types
is appealing even as a best-response rule from an individual perspective. Specifically,
when interacting with an agent whose behaviour is unknown, we may hypothesise a set
of types, each specifying a complete behaviour, and plan our own actions with respect
to those types which most closely match the agent’s observed actions.
To illustrate this idea, consider a simple example in which a machine plays a game
of Rock-Paper-Scissors against a human. The human may employ a variety of different
strategies unknown to the machine. However, the machine may hypothesise a set of
possible strategies that the human could use, such as “play previous action of other
player”, “play action that would have won in previous round”, etc. These hypothesised
strategies, or types, may be provided by a domain expert or generated automatically. By
comparing the predictions of the types with the actual actions taken by the human, the
machine can compute a posterior belief to describe the relative likelihood of types. The
posterior belief and type predictions can then be used to reason about subsequent turns
in the game, allowing the machine to plan optimal responses.
This method has a number of features particularly suited for ad hoc coordination
problems: First of all, the fact that we may hypothesise any types of behaviours, includ-
ing behaviours which are not necessarily “rational” with respect to an agent’s utilities,
gives us the flexibility to deal with a variety of agents. Furthermore, by committing to
a predefined set of types, we typically require only a fraction of the observations that
other forms of learning, such as opponent modelling, require. Even if the other agents
change their types over time, we may be able to adjust our posterior beliefs relatively
quickly, while other learning methods may have to start from scratch. Finally, the fact
that the types specify complete behaviours means that we can make predictions even
1Our interpretation of types as “behaviours” is consistent with the original definition in (Harsanyi,
1967, cf. “normalised strategies”, Section 7 (p. 180)), which defines types as parameters in both strategy
and payoff functions (as we do in our work; see Section 3.1 for further discussion.)
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for unseen situations, while other forms of learning may only be able to make predic-
tions for situations that have been encountered previously. These features can enable an
agent to plan its actions efficiently and with great flexibility.
On the other hand, there are several concerns and questions associated with this
method. An important concern is the possibility that the hypothesised types may be
incorrect, in the sense that their predictions deviate from our observations. Such in-
accuracies may have a profound impact on the quality of planning, which raises the
question of how much and what kind of inaccuracies are acceptable, and if it is possible
to ascertain whether to trust or altogether reject the hypothesised types. Other impor-
tant questions pertain to the dynamics of beliefs. What impact do prior beliefs, before
observing any actions, have on our long-term performance? And, in the ideal case in
which the true type of an agent is among the hypothesised types, can we be certain that
the posterior belief will eventually reveal the true type? These questions are essential to
the method outlined above, and they are the central topics of the present thesis.
1.1 Aims and Contributions
This thesis is a comprehensive study of the type-based methodology outlined above.
Specifically, the goal of the thesis is to study the potential and limitations of this idea in
the context of ad hoc coordination problems, both theoretically and empirically. We do
so by identifying and addressing a spectrum of central questions, from formalising the
type-based methodology to deriving a canonical algorithm; from empirical evaluations in
simulated and human-machine experiments to theoretical analyses of various properties
pertaining to beliefs and types (Figure 1.1). The following is a brief summary of the
questions addressed and the contributions made.
The thesis sets out by addressing the basic question of how to formalise the type-
based method. We propose a game-theoretic model, called the stochastic Bayesian game
(SBG), which combines Harsanyi’s notion of types with stochastic state transitions.
Therein, each player has one of a number of types which specify the player’s preferences
and behaviour, and the assignment of types is governed by some distribution over types.
Given the players’ actions, the system transitions stochastically between different states.
Based on this model, we give precise definitions of an agent’s flexibility and efficiency,
and we define the ad hoc coordination problem as designing an agent which optimises
its flexibility and efficiency in a SBG in which the true type spaces and type distribution
are unknown to the agent.
1.1. Aims and Contributions 5
Figure 1.1: Components of thesis.
Moreover, we derive a best-response rule called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coor-
dination (HBA), which can be viewed as a canonical algorithmic description of the
type-based method. HBA utilises a set of hypothesised types, where each type speci-
fies a possible behaviour for an agent. Specifically, given the current interaction history,
each type generates a probabilistic prediction of the agent’s next action. By comparing
these predictions with the actions taken by the agent, HBA computes a posterior belief
to quantify the relative likelihood of types. The posterior belief and the type predictions
are then used to make predictions about future trajectories in the interaction, based on
which HBA computes an optimal response.
To show how HBA can be applied, we present two empirical case studies. In the first
case study, we used HBA to interact with human subjects in one of two simple matrix
games. The implementation of HBA was “direct” in that it generated a complete tree of
all possible future trajectories, up to a certain depth. The results show that a handful of
simple types was sufficient to interact effectively with humans who exhibited a range of
behaviours. In the second case study, we used a more complex implementation of HBA
in a simulated logistics domain. Therein, the goal is to collect a number of different
objects by collaborating with other agents whose behaviours are initially unknown. We
show how HBA can be implemented as a reinforcement learning procedure to solve
such complex problems. The procedure uses stochastic sampling to “roll-out” possible
interaction trajectories, based on the types and posterior beliefs.
One of the central questions associated with HBA is the evolution of beliefs. Specif-
ically, how should HBA incorporate evidence in its beliefs, and under what conditions
will the beliefs converge to the true distribution of types? These questions are of central
importance, since incorrect beliefs may lead to suboptimal action choices. We intro-
duce three basic formulations of posterior beliefs, each suitable for a different class of
type distributions, and provide theoretical conditions under which they are guaranteed
to converge to the true type distribution. These theoretical insights enable the user to
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choose an appropriate posterior formulation for a given problem.
Before HBA observes any evidence on which to base its posterior belief, it will have
to make a prior judgment of how likely the types are. Could this prior belief have a
significant impact on the long-term performance of HBA? If so, how? And, importantly,
can we automatically compute prior beliefs with the goal of improving our long-term
performance? To find answers to these questions, we conducted a comprehensive series
of experiments which compared 10 methods to automatically compute prior beliefs from
a given set of types. The results show that prior beliefs can indeed have a significant
impact on the long-term performance, and that the depth of HBA’s planning horizon
plays a central role. Moreover, we show that automatic methods can compute prior
beliefs with consistent performance effects across a variety of scenarios.
A possible concern associated with HBA is the fact that the hypothesised types may
be incorrect. This may range from slight deviations in predicted action probabilities, to
predicting entirely different actions from what was observed. Therefore, an important
question is how accurate the hypothesised types have to be in order for HBA to be able
to solve its task? To address this question, we describe a methodology whereby we
formulate a hierarchy of desirable termination guarantees using a probabilistic temporal
logic, and analyse the conditions under which they are met. Furthermore, we provide
a novel characterisation of optimality which is based on the notion of probabilistic
bisimulation (Larsen and Skou, 1991). In addition to concisely defining what constitutes
optimal type spaces, this allows the user to apply efficient model checking algorithms
to verify optimality in practice.
The preceding analysis of optimal type spaces is done before any interaction and
with respect to the true types of the other agents. How can we decide whether or not
to trust our hypothesised types during the interaction? Unfortunately, posterior beliefs
are only a measure of relative likelihood between types, but they are no measure of
absolute truth. That is, even if our posterior belief points to one type, it does not mean
that the agent is indeed of this type. To complement the beliefs, we propose an automatic
statistical analysis in the form of a frequentist hypothesis test. The proposed method
can incorporate multiple statistical criteria in the test statistic and learns its distribution
during the interaction process, with asymptotic correctness guarantees. We present
results from a comprehensive set of experiments, demonstrating that the algorithm
achieves high accuracy and scalability at low computational costs.
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1.2 Scope and Limitations
Throughout this work, we will make a number of assumptions pertaining to what agents
can “see” and “do”. These assumptions largely determine the scope and limitations of
our work. To calibrate the reader’s expectations, it is worth pointing out the most impor-
tant assumptions before proceeding with the main material. Note that all assumptions
will be made precise and discussed in detail in the later chapters.
First of all, we assume that all agents can make decisions based on the entire inter-
action history, which includes all past states and joint actions. An agent is not required
to base its decisions on the entire history, but it can do so if it chooses to. Furthermore,
we do not restrict the behaviour of agents by requiring a specific implementation, such
as decision trees, finite state machines, etc. Rather, an agent’s behaviour (or type) may
implement any logic, and we will simply view it as a black-box programme. In addition,
agents are allowed to specify probabilities over actions rather than choosing actions de-
terministically. Finally, we do not require that agents’ preferences are aligned in any
sense (that is, they may have common or conflicting interests). Together, these features
mean that our work is applicable to a very broad spectrum of problems.
Our model makes a number of informational assumptions. Firstly, we assume that all
state and action spaces are finite (i.e. discrete). We believe it is possible to extend many
of our results to infinite (e.g. continuous) state and action spaces, but this may require
extra analysis and increase the computational complexity of our methods. Furthermore,
we assume that the state and action spaces, as well as the dynamics by which the system
transitions between states, are a priori known to us. This allows us to use a relatively
simple but effective planning procedure in our analysis. Finally, we assume that we
can always observe the current system state and the past actions chosen by all players
(this is sometimes referred to as full observability). Therefore, our work may not be
directly applicable to problems in which the system state or the players’ past actions are
not directly observed. Nonetheless, we expect that many of the observations we make
regarding the type-based methodology will still hold.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of 9 chapters in total. Chapters 3 to 8 contain the main contributions,
following the summary in Section 1.1. The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1.2,
and is briefly summarised as follows:
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
Figure 1.2: Structure of thesis.
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• Chapter 2 situates this thesis in the research literature and elaborates on some of
the claims made at the beginning of Chapter 1.
• Chapter 3 introduces the basic model, SBG, and algorithm, HBA, which are used
as the basis for all subsequent chapters.
• Chapter 4 presents two empirical case studies to demonstrate how HBA can be
applied in practice.
• Chapter 5 provides an analysis of convergence and correctness properties for
different formulations of posterior beliefs.
• Chapter 6 investigates the practical long-term impact of prior beliefs and whether
they can be computed automatically.
• Chapter 7 considers inaccuracies in hypothesised types and introduces a formal
notion of optimality.
• Chapter 8 describes an automatic statistical analysis to decide during the interaction
if the hypothesised types should be rejected.
• Finally, Chapter 9 concludes this thesis, highlights key results, and discusses
directions for future research.
The recommended reading order is shown by the arrows in Figure 1.2. However,
the only mandatory part is Chapter 3, after which the reader may choose to proceed
with any of the subsequent chapters. Each chapter begins with a brief summary of the
questions addressed in the chapter as well as the contributions made therein.
1.4 Publications
Parts of this thesis appeared in the following publications:
• S.V. Albrecht, S. Ramamoorthy. Are You Doing What I Think You Are Doing?
Criticising Uncertain Agent Models. In Proceedings of the 31st Conference on
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2015.
→ Chapter 8
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• S.V. Albrecht, J.W. Crandall, S. Ramamoorthy. An Empirical Study on the Prac-
tical Impact of Prior Beliefs over Policy Types. In Proceedings of the 29th AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Austin, Texas, USA, 2015.
→ Chapter 6
• S.V. Albrecht, S. Ramamoorthy. On Convergence and Optimality of Best-Response
Learning with Policy Types in Multiagent Systems. In Proceedings of the 30th
Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Quebec City, Canada, 2014.
→ Chapters 5 and 7
• S.V. Albrecht, S. Ramamoorthy. A Game-Theoretic Model and Best-Response
Learning Method for Ad Hoc Coordination in Multiagent Systems (Extended Ab-
stract). In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA, 2013.
→ Chapters 3 and 4
Currently under review:
• S.V. Albrecht, J.W. Crandall, S. Ramamoorthy. Belief and Truth in Hypothesised
Behaviours. Submitted for review to Artificial Intelligence Journal in July 2015.
→ Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8
Related to this thesis, though not officially part of it, are the following publications:
• S.V. Albrecht, J.W. Crandall, S. Ramamoorthy. E-HBA: Using Action Policies for
Expert Advice and Agent Typification. In Proceedings of the AAAI-15 Workshop
on Multiagent Interaction without Prior Coordination, Austin, Texas, USA, 2015.
• S.V. Albrecht, S. Ramamoorthy. Comparative Evaluation of MAL Algorithms in a
Diverse Set of Ad Hoc Team Problems. In Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Valencia, Spain, 2012.
Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter situates this thesis within the wider research literature. We will discuss a
number of related works and point out differences and similarities to our work. However,
we note that this chapter is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of all related works,
and we also refer to the references made within the cited works.
2.1 Ad Hoc Teamwork
This thesis was originally motivated by a challenge paper written by Stone et al. (2010),
in which they describe the problem of ad hoc teamwork. Therein, the goal is to design
an autonomous agent, called the ad hoc agent, which can collaborate with an existing
team of other agents with no or only limited opportunity for prior coordination.1 This
problem was motivated by the fact that much prior research had focused on teamwork
based on prior coordination (e.g. Kaminka and Frenkel, 2007; Grosz and Kraus, 1999;
Tambe, 1997; Grosz and Kraus, 1996). See also (Wooldridge, 2009, Chapter 8).
Similar to ad hoc coordination, the key aspects of ad hoc teamwork are that the
ad hoc agent should be flexible enough to interact efficiently with a variety of other
agents, with no prior coordination. However, there are several differences to ad hoc
coordination2: First of all, ad hoc teamwork assumes that the interests of all agents
(including the ad hoc agent) are perfectly aligned, which means that their payoffs are
identical (Stone et al., 2010). In contrast, ad hoc coordination does not assume that
1For completeness, it should be pointed out that similar problems were discussed earlier under the
names of “pickup teams” (Dias et al., 2006) and “impromptu teams” (Bowling and McCracken, 2005).
2Initially, we too used the term “ad hoc teamwork”; see (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012). We
decided to use the term “ad hoc coordination” after an anonymous reviewer pointed out that ad hoc
teamwork assumes common payoffs, which we do not. The new term also serves to differentiate our
formal definition of the problem from the informal description in (Stone et al., 2010).
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the interests of the involved agents are necessarily aligned. Furthermore, the problem
description in (Stone et al., 2010) is of a procedural nature, whereas ad hoc coordination
is based on a precise formal definition (see Chapter 3). Finally, ad hoc coordination
has a very strict notion of “no prior coordination”, namely that the ad hoc agent has
no prior knowledge of the other agents’ behaviours. On the other hand, much work in
ad hoc teamwork has assumed that the ad hoc agent a priori knows the other agents’
behaviours (e.g. Genter and Stone, 2014; Genter et al., 2013; Agmon and Stone, 2012;
Stone and Kraus, 2010) or the structure of their behaviours (e.g. Agmon et al., 2014;
Chakraborty and Stone, 2013).
Closely related to our work is the work of Barrett (2014), who studied a variant
of the type-based method in the context of ad hoc teamwork. In (Barrett et al., 2011),
an algorithm similar to the one discussed in Section 4.2 is evaluated in a version of
the pursuit domain. This algorithm is later augmented by learning agent models (or
types) from past interactions (Barrett et al., 2013). In the same work, they also show
how transfer learning may be used to improve the learned models based on observations
from the current interaction. Finally, in (Barrett and Stone, 2015), they further augment
the algorithm by learning both agent models and corresponding response policies offline
from past interactions. We view these works as complementing our work, in the sense
that they are focused on utilising past experience whereas we are focused on issues
pertaining to the evolution of beliefs and optimality of types. Another notable difference
is that Barrett et al. assume no adaptation in the behaviour of other agents, while we
explicitly take learning behaviours into account.
2.2 Multiagent Learning
Multiagent learning is concerned with the design and analysis of agents that can learn to
interact with other agents. There exists a large body of research in this area, and a number
of different approaches have been studied (e.g. Banerjee and Sen, 2007; Conitzer and
Sandholm, 2007; Foster and Young, 2003; Hu and Wellman, 2003; Bowling and Veloso,
2002; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001; Claus and Boutilier, 1998). We refer to (Young,
2004) for an excellent discussion of different learning methods. The principal algorithm
studied in this thesis, HBA, can be viewed as a learning algorithm as well, in the sense
that the evolution of its beliefs form a continual learning process.
Multiagent learning algorithms can be categorised according to several criteria.
One criterion is whether the algorithm controls a single agent or a collective of agents.
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This thesis is concerned with the ad hoc coordination problem, in which the algorithm
controls a single agent to interact with previously unknown other agents. Hence, our
algorithm, HBA, controls a single agent. Another criterion is whether the algorithm
seeks an equilibrium solution or primarily tries to optimise its own payoffs (the latter
is sometimes called a best-response algorithm). In this work, we seek to optimise the
flexibility and efficiency of the controlled agent, hence our algorithm belongs to the latter
category. In fact, it can be argued whether it makes sense at all to seek an equilibrium
solution in ad hoc coordination problems. This is because solution concepts such as the
Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950) implicitly make strong assumptions about the behaviour
and preferences of the involved players, including perfect rationality and selfishness.
However, in ad hoc coordination, there is no guarantee that the involved agents satisfy
such assumptions. They may, in fact, not seek any equilibrium solution at all.
A reason why ad hoc coordination is an important open problem is the fact that
many multiagent learning algorithms are inadequate for such problems. In a compre-
hensive experimental study (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012), we compared several
salient methods of multiagent learning in ad hoc coordination problems and pointed out
a number of limitations. Perhaps the most crucial limitation is the fact that many mul-
tiagent learning algorithms were designed in the context of homogeneous systems, in
which all agents use the same algorithm. This may be implicit, in the sense that perfor-
mance guarantees hold only in self-play (i.e. the same algorithm playing against itself),
or explicit, by introducing additional coordination mechanisms such as communication
protocols (e.g. Sen et al., 2003). However, in the context of ad hoc coordination, this
may significantly reduce the flexibility of such algorithms. Another limitation is the fact
that many algorithms, in particular those based on reinforcement learning, require long
learning periods, even for the simplest tasks (e.g. Claus and Boutilier, 1998). This, in
turn, reduces their efficiency (as defined in this work; see Chapters 1 and 3).
2.3 Opponent Modelling
Opponent modelling attempts to learn a model of an agent’s behaviour based on the
agent’s observed actions. Formally, a model can be viewed as a function which takes as
input the current (or any) interaction history and returns a deterministic or probabilistic
prediction of the agent’s next action. The learning usually takes place in an iterative
fashion, after each observed action, by setting a number of parameters in some predefined
model structure. The resulting model can be used in a planning procedure to compute
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(a) Individual types (b) Class of models
Figure 2.1: Visualisation of type-based and “traditional” opponent modelling. The square
represents the space of all possible behaviours. Each point in the square corresponds to
a complete behaviour. (a) The type-based method allows us to hypothesise any types of
behaviours. (b) Traditional methods cover an entire class (circle) of behaviours, but no
behaviours outside that class.
optimal responses. Many different methods for opponent modelling have been studied
(e.g. Hindriks and Tykhonov, 2008; van den Herik et al., 2005; Wendler and Bach, 2004;
Steffens, 2004; Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee, 2000; Carmel and Markovitch, 1993).
The type-based method studied in this thesis can be viewed as a special case of
opponent modelling. Here, the model structure consists of some finite number of hypoth-
esised types, each of which is itself a model, and the parameters are the probabilities
in the beliefs. (Other works define continuous type spaces, e.g. Southey et al. (2005);
Chalkiadakis and Boutilier (2003).) In contrast to this, more “traditional” methods for
opponent modelling assume a skeleton implementation of a behaviour, such as a deci-
sion tree or a finite state machine, and set implementation-specific parameters, such as
node values and edges, to account for the observed actions. One of the earliest formula-
tions of such a traditional method is fictitious play (Brown, 1951), in which the other
agent’s behaviour is modelled as a stationary probability distribution over the agent’s
actions, and the learning takes place by monitoring the action frequencies. Figure 2.1
visualises the difference between type-based and “traditional” methods.
In the context of ad hoc coordination, the type-based method has several key advan-
tages over traditional methods: Firstly, traditional methods are by definition confined to
a limited class of behaviours (those which can be represented by the assumed implemen-
tation), whereas the type-based method is free to hypothesise any types of behaviours,
regardless of their implementation. This potentially gives us the flexibility to account
for a greater variety of behaviours. Secondly, since types specify complete behaviours,
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they can be used to make predictions for unseen situations. In contrast, models pro-
duced by traditional methods may only make reliable predictions for situations that
have been encountered before (or similar situations, depending on the method’s ability
to generalise observations). In addition, if the observed agent switches to an entirely dif-
ferent behaviour, the type-based method may be able to respond quickly to this change
by updating its belief over types (provided that the new behaviour is accounted for by
another type), while the traditional method would typically have to start its learning
from scratch. The latter two properties of the type-based method are useful in achieving
high efficiency in ad hoc coordination problems.
Of course, as with any opponent modelling technique, there is a risk that the underly-
ing assumptions do not hold, which means that the model may be inaccurate. Translated
to the type-based method, this means that the hypothesised types may be incorrect, and
this is one of the main concerns addressed in this thesis. Nonetheless, in this regard, the
type-based method has one more useful feature: it allows us to include traditional mod-
elling methods as a special kind of type. Therefore, if none of hypothesised types are
correct, we can fall back to models created by the traditional methods.
2.4 Bayesian Games
Perhaps the earliest formulation of the type-based methodology was in the form of
Bayesian games by Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b). Bayesian games are an attempt to address
incomplete information games, in which certain aspects of the game (typically the
payoff distributions of other players) are unknown. Harsanyi proposed to model this
“private information” as types: every player has one of a number of types unknown to
the other players, and the assignment of types is governed by some distribution over
types. By assuming that the type spaces and type distribution are common knowledge,
this reduces the incomplete information game to a complete (but imperfect) information
game, admitting a solution in the form of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. While this
idea was controversial at the time3, Bayesian games have become a firm part of game
theory and there exists a substantial body of work on learning and equilibria in Bayesian
games (e.g. Nachbar, 2005; Dekel et al., 2004; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993; Jordan, 1991).
This thesis can be viewed as applying Harsanyi’s notion of types to the problem
3The controversy was centred around the assumption that players a priori know the true distribution of
types. (From a personal conversation with Reinhard Selten, a former collaborator and Nobel co-recipient
of John Harsanyi, and major contributor to the theory of Bayesian games.) Note that we do not make
such an assumption in our work; in fact, other players may not even use a type-based reasoning.
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of ad hoc coordination in multiagent systems. Indeed, much of the work presented in
this thesis is inspired by the body of work on Bayesian games, and this can be seen in
the notation and language we use. Moreover, in Chapter 5, we show how the seminal
result by Kalai and Lehrer (1993) can be extended to account for our work as well.
Nonetheless, there are a number of important differences between Bayesian games and
our work: Formally, the most crucial difference is that Bayesian games, in their original
form, assume that the type spaces and type distribution are common knowledge, whereas
we assume that they are unknown to us. Therefore, the principal body of this thesis is
concerned with beliefs over hypothesised (“guessed”) type spaces. Furthermore, much
of the work on Bayesian games is focused on equilibrium attainment, and the usual
assumption is that all players use the same type-based Bayesian reasoning. In contrast,
we are interested in flexibility and efficiency, and we make no assumption about the
behaviour of other agents (i.e. they may use an entirely different reasoning).
2.5 Interactive POMDPs
Interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDP) (Gmytrasiewicz
and Doshi, 2005) are related to stochastic Bayesian games (the model used in this thesis;
see Chapter 3) in the sense that they, too, assume that agents have a latent model (or type).
Technically, I-POMDPs extend the framework of POMDPs (Kaelbling et al., 1998) to
the multiagent domain by incorporating the model spaces into the state space. Therefore,
agents have to make decisions in the presence of uncertainty regarding both the state of
the environment and the models of other agents. The models themselves are categorised
into two groups: sub-intentional models, which can be any kinds of behaviours (similar
to types in our work); and intentional models, which can be viewed as an I-POMDP of
a lower recursive level. Hence, I-POMDPs explicitly consider recursive belief nesting
of the form “I believe that you believe that I believe...”.4
A number of contributions have been made to the theory and practice of I-POMDPs.
For example, several solution techniques have been developed (e.g. Doshi et al., 2009;
Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2009; Doshi and Perez, 2008) and there are documented
attempts to use I-POMDPs to model human reasoning (Doshi et al., 2010) and address
money laundering (Ng et al., 2010). An interesting parallel to our work is that the
convergence result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) (cf. Chapter 5) has also been extended to
4While we do not explicitly model nested beliefs, they can be modelled implicitly within the types.
Hence, our work also accounts for agents that reason about other agents’ beliefs.
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the framework of I-POMDPs (Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2006). Another interesting
connection is the use of behavioural equivalences (Rathnasabapathy et al., 2006), which
is similar to our use of bisimulation equivalences (cf. Chapter 7).
However, despite these similarities, there are several notable differences: First of
all, I-POMDPs assume partially observable states whereas we assume fully observable
states. While this makes I-POMDPs more general, it can make their solutions very
complex and expensive (e.g. Ng et al., 2010). Furthermore, I-POMDPs assume that
agents have a fixed model throughout the interaction process, whereas we also allow
for other dynamics such as mixed and correlated type distributions. However, perhaps
the most important difference is in the focus of our work: I-POMDPs have primarily
focused on the possibility of nested beliefs, which further complicates their solutions
(Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz, 2009). In contrast, much of our work is focused on the
possibility of incorrect hypothesised types. In this regard, we believe that many of the
results reported in this thesis are also relevant to the framework of I-POMDPs.
2.6 Plan Recognition
A related area of research, commonly referred to as plan recognition, is concerned
with inferring an agent’s goals and intentions based on the agent’s observed actions.
The traditional methodology in plan recognition is to assume that the observed agent
follows some recipe of actions, called a plan, and that the correct plan can be found in
a given library of plans. One of the principal questions in plan recognition is how to
structure such plans to facilitate efficient search and inference. For a slightly dated but
nevertheless useful survey, we refer to (Carberry, 2001).
The notion of plans and plan libraries is similar to that of types and type spaces.
However, plans often have intricate auxiliary structure, including properties to describe
when actions can be applied and what effects they have, as well as temporal and causal
orderings, etc. (e.g. Avrahami-Zilberbrand and Kaminka, 2007; Albrecht et al., 1998;
Charniak and Goldman, 1993). In contrast to this, we define types as black-box functions
and leave their precise structure open. Another central issue in plan recognition is the
narrowing of competing plan hypotheses, using methods such as user dialogs, utility
estimation, and various heuristics (Sukthankar et al., 2014). On the other hand, the
selection (or mixing) of types is done via the posterior beliefs.
An interesting phenomenon which may complicate the search for the correct plan
is the possibility that observed actions may have been taken with a certain intention
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but led to an unintended result. On the other hand, some actions may be unintentional
(e.g. Bonchek-Dokow et al., 2009) in the sense that they do not contribute towards
achieving any goal. While important in the context of plan recognition, these issues
are less relevant in the type-based methodology because types are not used to infer
an agent’s goals or intentions. However, they may become relevant if we consider the
possibility that an adversarial agent might attempt to deceive us into believing that it is
of a certain type. This possibility is not considered in the present thesis.
Plan recognition methods can be categorised into unobtrusive and obtrusive methods.
In the first case, sometimes called keyhole recognition, the plan recogniser has no
influence over the observed agent’s actions. This is similar to the method described
in Chapter 8, which performs automated statistical analyses to decide whether or not
to reject a hypothesised type. This method may also be useful in the context of plan
recognition, for the case in which plans allow for stochastic action choices.
2.7 Model Criticism & Checking
A potential concern in the type-based methodology is the fact that the hypothesised
types may be incorrect, in the sense that they do not accurately describe the observed
agent’s behaviour. Therefore, much of our work is concerned with the implications of
incorrect types and the possibility to reject types.
There exists a large body of literature on what is often referred to as model criticism
(e.g. Bayarri and Berger, 2000; Meng, 1994; Rubin, 1984; Box, 1980). Model criticism
attempts to answer the following question: given a data set D and model M, could
D have been generated by M? This is analogous to our question, in which D is a
sequence of observed actions of some agent and M is a hypothesised behaviour for
that agent. However, in contrast to our work, model criticism usually assumes that the
data are independent and identically distributed, which is not the case in the interactive
setting we consider. In Chapter 8, we show how a particular form of model criticism,
namely frequentist hypothesis testing, can be used to decide whether or not to trust our
hypothesised types, or the combination of beliefs and types.
A related area of research is that of model checking, which attempts to verify that a
given system (or model) satisfies certain formal properties (Clarke et al., 1999). For the
case of stochastic processes, one particular form of model checking is given by the con-
cept of probabilistic bisimulation (Baier, 1996; Larsen and Skou, 1991). Essentially,
two stochastic processes are considered bisimilar if they can match each others tran-
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sitions on average. In Chapter 7, we use the concept of probabilistic bisimulation to
address the question of “incorrect” hypothesised types, showing that a certain form of
optimality is preserved if a bisimulation relation exists.
Another related problem, sometimes referred to as identity testing, is to test if a given
sequence of data was generated by some given stochastic process (Ryabko and Ryabko,
2008; Basawa and Scott, 1977). Instead of independent and identical distributions, this
line of work assumes other properties such as stationarity and ergodicity. Unfortunately,
these assumptions are also unlikely in interaction processes, and the proposed solutions
are very costly. Model criticism and identity testing are not to be confused with model
selection, in which two or more alternative models are under consideration (e.g. Vehtari
and Ojanen, 2012). Similarly, we do not actively decide between different types when
planning our own actions. Instead, actions are planned with respect to all types, weighted
by the posterior beliefs ascribed to them. Therefore, our analysis of incorrect types in
Chapter 7 is with respect to our beliefs over all types. However, the method in Chapter 8
can be applied to individual types or to the combination of beliefs and types.
2.8 Synonymous Terminology
As shown in this chapter, our work is at the intersection of a number of research areas.
As a result, there exist different terminologies for essentially equivalent concepts. The
following is a brief listing of terms with synonymous meaning in this thesis:
player, agent — Formally, we use the term “player” to denote a certain role or position
in a game (e.g. Player 1 or “Goal Keeper”) while the term “agent” is used to refer
to an instance of a decision making algorithm which controls a player. Hence, we
may say that Player 1 is controlled by an HBA agent. However, for all practical
purposes, the terms may be used synonymously.
payoff, utility, reward — These terms all refer to the numerical signal received by the
agent (or player) after taking an action. We normally prefer the term “payoff”.
strategy, policy, model, and type — The terms “strategy”, “policy”, and “model” all
refer to a function that governs a player’s behaviour (i.e. how actions are chosen
based on the current interaction history). Formally, a “type” is an abstract parame-
ter which specifies a player’s preferences (i.e. payoffs) and strategy. However, for
convenience, we may use the term “type” to refer to a player’s behaviour. Thus,




This thesis studies the type-based method in the context of ad hoc coordination. As
outlined in Chapter 1, the idea is to interact with previously unknown agents by com-
paring their observed actions with a set of hypothesised behaviours, called types. In this
chapter, we will introduce formal definitions to make this idea precise. Specifically, we
will address the following questions: How can we model types in interactive processes?
What precisely does ad hoc coordination mean in this context? And, finally, how can
we utilise types to address ad hoc coordination?
We begin by introducing a game-theoretic model called the stochastic Bayesian
game (SBG). Therein, each player has one of a number of types which specify their
preferences and behaviours, and the assignment of types is governed by a distribution
over types. Given the players’ actions, the game transitions between different states
until some terminal state is reached. Based on this model, we give precise definitions of
an agent’s flexibility and efficiency, and we define the ad hoc coordination problem as
designing an agent, called the ad hoc agent, which is able to optimise its flexibility and
efficiency in a SBG in which the true type spaces and distribution are unknown.
Moreover, we derive a best-response rule called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coor-
dination (HBA), which can be viewed as a canonical algorithmic description of the
type-based method. HBA utilises a set of hypothesised types, where each type speci-
fies a possible behaviour for an agent. Specifically, given the current interaction history,
each type generates a probabilistic prediction of the agent’s next action. By comparing
these predictions with the actions taken by the agent, HBA computes a posterior belief
to quantify the relative likelihood of types. The posterior belief and the type predictions
are then used to make predictions about future trajectories in the interaction, based on
which HBA computes an optimal response.
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3.1 Stochastic Bayesian Games
As discussed earlier, we will use the notion of types in Bayesian games to formalise ad
hoc coordination. However, in their original form (Harsanyi, 1967), Bayesian games are
not descriptive enough to allow us to model the kinds of problems we are interested in,
as they do neither include states nor time. Therefore, we combine Bayesian games with
the concept of stochastic games (Shapley, 1953) to obtain a more descriptive model
which we call the stochastic Bayesian game:
Definition 1. A stochastic Bayesian game (SBG) consists of:
• finite state space S with initial state s0 ∈ S and terminal states S̄⊂ S
• players N = {1, ...,n} and for each i ∈ N:
– finite set of actions Ai (where A = A1× ...×An)
– infinite type space Θ j (where Θ = Θ1× ...×Θn)
– payoff function ui : S×A×Θi→ R
– strategy πi : H×Ai×Θi→ [0,1]
• state transition function T : S×A×S→ [0,1]
• type distribution ϒ : N0×Θ+→ [0,1], where Θ+ is a finite subset of Θ.
H is the set of all histories Ht = 〈s0,a0,s1,a1, ...,st〉 with t ≥ 0, such that s0, ...,st ∈ S
and a0, ...,at−1 ∈ A. Hence, each player may choose actions based on entire histories.
A stochastic Bayesian game defines the interaction process as follows:
Definition 2. A SBG starts at time t = 0 in state s0:
1. In state st , the types θt1, ...,θ
t
n are sampled from Θ
+ with probability ϒ(t,θt1, ...,θ
t
n),
and each player i is informed only about its own type θti.
2. Based on the history Ht , each player i chooses an action ati ∈ Ai with probability
πi(Ht ,ati,θ
t
i), resulting in the joint action a
t = (at1, ...,a
t
n).
3. The game transitions into a successor state st+1∈ S with probability T (st ,at ,st+1),
and each player i receives an individual payoff given by ui(st ,at ,θti).
This process is repeated until a terminal state st ∈ S̄ is reached, after which the game
stops. We then say that the task is solved.
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We also define several classes of type distributions:
Definition 3. A type distribution ϒ is called static if ∀t, t̂ ∀θ ∈Θ+ : ϒ(t,θ) = ϒ(t̂,θ). A
type distribution which is not static is called dynamic.
Unless stated otherwise, we consider static type distributions by default. For conve-
nience, we may write static type distributions as ϒ(θ).
Definition 4. A type distribution ϒ is called pure if ∀t ∃θ ∈ Θ+ : ϒ(t,θ) = 1. A type
distribution which is not pure is called mixed.
Our definition of types follows the original definition of Harsanyi (1967). This
means that a type determines a player’s payoffs and strategies (see also Dekel et al.,
2004). However, since we define strategies with respect to a history of states and actions
(rather than just the current state), a type may in fact specify strategies which change
over time, and we thus also refer to it as behaviour. Therefore, our interpretation of
types is that of a “programme” which governs the behaviour of a player.
In contrast to original Bayesian games, our type spaces Θi contain all possible
behaviours for player i. This set is infinite and uncountable because the strategy πi
assigns probabilities to actions, and the interval [0,1] is itself infinite and uncountable.
Therefore, in order for ϒ to be a well-defined probability distribution, we define it over
a finite subset Θ+ ⊂Θ. To differentiate the two spaces, we sometimes refer to Θi as the
full type space and to Θ+i as the true types of player i. For convenience (and by abuse
of notation), we will allow ϒ(t,θ) for any θ ∈Θ, with ϒ(t,θ) = 0 if θ 6= Θ+.
3.2 Assumptions
Each player in the game may correspond to a specific role. For instance, if we model
a soccer team, player 1 may correspond to the goal keeper. In the following sections,
we implicitly assume that the ad hoc agent, denoted α, controls the player of interest,
denoted i, by which we mean that α chooses the strategy πi. Furthermore, i has a fixed
type which is defined by α, hence we may write ui(st ,at ,α) and πi(Ht ,ai,α), or we
may simply drop the α for compactness. Finally, we will use j and −i to refer to the
other players (e.g. A−i =× j 6=i A j).
Throughout this work, we will make the following general assumptions:
Assumption 1. We assume full observability of states and actions. That is, every player
is always informed of the current history Ht before making a decision.
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Assumption 2. For any type θ j ∈Θ j and history Ht ∈H, there exists a unique sequence
(χa j)a j∈A j such that π j(H
t ,a j,θ j) = χa j for all a j ∈ A j.
We refer to this as external randomisation and to the opposite (when there is no
unique χa j) as internal randomisation. Technically, Assumption 2 is implied by the
fact that π j is a function, which means that any input is mapped to exactly one output.
However, in practice this can be violated if randomisation is used “inside” a type
implementation, hence it is worth stating it explicitly. Nonetheless, it can be shown that
under full observability, external randomisation is equivalent to internal randomisation.
Hence, Assumption 2 does not limit the types we can represent.
Example 1. Let there be two actions, A and B, and let the expected payoffs for agent
i be E(A)> E(B). The agent uses ε-greedy action selection (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
with ε > 0. If agent i randomises externally, then the strategy πi will assign action
probabilities 〈1−ε/2,ε/2〉. If the agent randomises internally, then with probability ε it
will assign probabilities 〈0.5,0.5〉 and with probability 1− ε it will assign 〈1,0〉, which
is equivalent to external randomisation.
3.3 Flexibility & Efficiency
Two important aspects of ad hoc coordination are flexibility and efficiency. We now
define each of them formally within the model of stochastic Bayesian games. The
definitions rely on the notion of paths and probabilities of paths. We will use the
notation Γϒ to say that SBG Γ uses a specific type distribution ϒ.
Definition 5. (i) A path ρ in SBG Γ is a sequence 〈s0ρ,θ0ρ,a0ρ,s1ρ,θ1ρ,a1ρ, ...,s
tρ
ρ 〉 where
sτρ ∈ S, θτρ ∈Θ, aτρ ∈ A, and s0ρ = s0.
(ii) A path ρ is terminating if stρρ ∈ S̄, otherwise it is non-terminating.


















where Hτρ is the history extracted from ρ until time τ.
For Pr(ρ|Γϒ) to be well-defined (that is, there exists a set X such that ∀ρ ∈ X :
Pr(ρ|Γϒ)≥ 0 and ∑ρ∈X Pr(ρ|Γϒ) = 1), it is important to note the following two impli-
cations in the definition of SBGs. Firstly, no path ρ can be prefixed by a terminating
path, meaning that there is no sτρ ∈ ρ such that τ < tρ and sτρ ∈ S̄. This is important since
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otherwise Pr(ρ|Γϒ) might assign positive probability to a path which is prefixed by a
terminating path and, thus, could never occur. Secondly, the only paths that can occur
are either terminating (and hence finite) or non-terminating and infinite (i.e. t → ∞).
Thus, if Φ is the set of all terminating paths and Ψ the set of all infinite non-terminating
paths, then ∑ρ∈Φ∪Ψ Pr(ρ|Γϒ) = 1.
Based on the notion of paths, we define the flexibility and efficiency of ad hoc agent
α as follows:
Definition 6. Let Φ be the set of all terminating paths in SBG Γ. Given a set of type
distributions T for Γ, the flexibility F(α|Γ,T) and efficiency E(α|Γ,T) of agent α in Γ
























where Pr(ρ|Γϒ) = Pr(ρ|Γϒ)∑ρ′∈Φ Pr(ρ′|Γϒ) , and r1,r2 ≥ 1 specify the relative importance (that is,
trade-off) between payoff and time.
F(α|Γ,T) and E(α|Γ,T) can be interpreted as, respectively, the average probability
with which agent α solves the task in Γ and the average payoff per time step α received
in solved tasks, where T specifies all possible type distributions (and, thereby, types that
can occur). In the above definitions, every type distribution ϒ ∈ T is given equal weight
in the average. If required, this could be further generalised by introducing specific
weights for each type distribution. Finally, we note that there may be problems in which
flexibility is not a relevant metric, e.g. because the game terminates after a fixed number
of time steps. In such cases, the primary metric is efficiency.
3.4 The Ad Hoc Coordination Problem
We are now in a position to formally define the ad hoc coordination problem. The core
aspect is that there is no prior coordination between the ad hoc agent and the other
agents in the system. We express this formally in two variants of the problem:
Definition 7. Let Γ be a SBG with true type spaces Θ+j , and let T be a set of type
distributions over Θ+. Player i is controlled by ad hoc agent α.
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Algorithm 1 Evaluation procedure to approximate flexibility and efficiency
Input: SBG Γ, set of type distributions T, ad hoc agent α,
player i (to be controlled by α), K ∈ N+




Randomly draw type distribution ϒ ∈ T
Generate path ρ in Γϒ (α controls i)
If ρ terminates do














(i) The semi ad hoc coordination problem is to optimise the flexibility F(α|Γ,T)
and efficiency E(α|Γ,T) of α, subject to the constraint that α knows all elements of Γ
(including Θ+j ) except for the type distributions ϒ used in Γϒ (for all ϒ ∈ T).
(ii) The (full) ad hoc coordination problem is to optimise the flexibility F(α|Γ,T)
and efficiency E(α|Γ,T) of α, subject to the constraint that α knows all elements of Γ
except for Θ+j and the type distributions ϒ used in Γϒ (for all ϒ ∈ T).
Computing F(α|Γ,T) and E(α|Γ,T) exactly is infeasible for all but the simplest
games. We propose to approximate these by using the procedure given in Algorithm 1.
The procedure generates K samples Fk ∼ F(α|Γ,T) and Ek ∼ E(α|Γ,T), based on
which it approximates F(α|Γ,T) = 1K ∑k Fk and E(α|Γ,T) =
1
K ∑k Ek. Since all Fk and
Ek, respectively, come from the same distribution, by the law of large numbers this
will converge to the true values of F(α|Γ,T) and E(α|Γ,T) for K→ ∞. The procedure
needs some means to determine if a path is non-terminating. This could be done, for
instance, by checking if the path reached a state space which contains no terminal states
and cannot be left anymore, or by setting a maximum path length after which a path is
assumed to be non-terminating (as we do in Section 4.2).
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3.5 Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination
The problem of incomplete information is solved in Bayesian games by assuming that
the (true) type spaces Θ+j and type distribution ϒ are common knowledge. This admits
a solution in the form of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1968a), which we
here define within the context of SBGs:
Definition 8. Let Ht be the history at time t. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in












π(Ht ,a,θ) = ∏
k∈N
πk(Ht ,ak,θk). (3.6)
In ad hoc coordination problems, the ad hoc agent does not know the type distribution
ϒ of the game. Therefore, it cannot compute ϒ(t,θ−i|θi). However, using the history
Ht , it can compute a posterior belief Pr(θ−i|Ht) = ∏ j 6=i Pr j(θ j|Ht), where Pr j(θ j|Ht)
is the probability that player j has type θ j based on history Ht
Pr j(θ j|Ht) =
L(Ht |θ j)Pj(θ j)
∑θ̂ j∈Θ+j
L(Ht |θ̂ j)Pj(θ̂ j)
, (3.7)
L(Ht |θ j) is the likelihood of history Ht if player j has type θ j, and Pj(θ j) is the agent’s
prior belief that player j has type θ j.
The likelihood L specifies how evidence (i.e. observed actions) is incorporated to
form the posterior belief. Note that, in contrast to probabilities, a likelihood is merely
required to be non-negative but not necessarily to sum up to 1. We will look at several
likelihood specifications in Chapters 4 and 5. For the purposes of this chapter, we define
the default likelihood as




π j(Hτ,aτj,θ j). (3.8)
Much work has been devoted to equilibrium analysis in games in which all players
maintain posterior beliefs as defined above (cf. Section 2.4). For example, it has been
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shown that a Nash equilibrium (NE) (Nash, 1950) can emerge under certain conditions
(e.g. Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). However, while these are encouraging theoretical results,
there are several potential objections concerning the use of equilibrium concepts such
as NE: Firstly, if there are multiple NE, then the players may converge to a sub-optimal
equilibrium. Secondly, a NE is incomplete in that it does not specify strategies for
off-equilibrium paths. Moreover, Dekel et al. (2004) have shown that if the prior beliefs
of the players are not identical, then they may converge to a solution which is not a NE.
However, our main concern with NE is that it makes strong assumptions regarding the
players’ behaviours (such as perfect rationality and selfishness) which may be difficult to
justify in ad hoc coordination. For instance, human players have been shown to deviate
from such assumptions (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The same arguments hold
for solution concepts in extensive form games, such as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
and sequential equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a).
Rather than attempting to converge to a Nash equilibrium, it is appealing to use (3.4)
as a best-response rule, since it maximises the expected payoff with respect to what
types the ad hoc agent believes the other players to have and their strategies for all types.
However, in its current form, (3.4) only considers immediate payoffs whereas optimal
behaviour may require an agent to take payoffs of future states into account. Therefore,
we propose to combine (3.4) with the Bellman optimality equation (Bellman, 1957) to
obtain a best-response rule which we call Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination1, or
HBA for short. Since full ad hoc coordination requires that the ad hoc agent does not
know the true type spaces Θ+j , we assume instead that it has access to hypothesised (i.e.
“guessed” by the user, hence also called user-defined) type spaces Θ∗j ⊂Θ j. (For semi





Definition 9. Let Γ be an ad hoc coordination problem (full or semi) where ad hoc
agent α controls player i and has access to hypothesised type spaces Θ∗−i = × j 6=i Θ∗j .











π j(Ĥ,a j,θ∗j) (3.10)
is the expected long-term payoff for player i of taking action ai in state s after history Ĥ
1The name is explained as follows: HBA is a combination of Harsanyi’s Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(3.10) and Bellman’s optimality principle (3.11), applied to the problem of Ad Hoc Coordination.
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Algorithm 2 Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA)
Input: SBG Γ, player i, hypothesised type spaces Θ∗j ,
history Ht , discount factor 0≤ γ≤ 1
Output: Action probabilities πi(Ht ,ai,α)
1. For each j 6= i and θ∗j ∈Θ∗j , compute posterior probability




2. For each ai ∈ Ai, compute expected payoff Eaist (H
t) with

















where Pr(θ∗−i|Ht) = ∏ j 6=i Pr j(θ∗j |Ht) and ai,−i , (ai,a−i)




(ai,−i , (ai,a−i)), and











is the expected long-term payoff for player i when joint action a is executed in state s
after history Ĥ, with 0≤ γ≤ 1 being the discount factor.
HBA is a modification of (3.4) which replaces ϒ(t,θ−i|θi) by the posterior Pr(θ−i|Ht)
(3.7), and in which the immediate payoff ui is replaced by an altered version (3.11) of
the Bellman optimality equation. The actual history Ht is used to compute the posterior,
and the projected histories Ĥ are used to generate all future trajectories. A summary of
HBA in algorithmic form is given in Algorithm 2.
Intuitively, HBA chooses actions which maximise the expected long-term payoff
with respect to what types HBA currently believes the other agents to have. It does so
by expanding a tree of all possible future trajectories of the interaction. Each trajectory
is weighted by the predictions of the hypothesised types as well as HBA’s current
beliefs regarding the relative likelihood of types. This allows HBA to compute expected
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payoffs for each of its actions, by traversing the tree from the bottom (leaves) to the top
(root). After the expected payoffs have been calculated, HBA chooses one of the actions
with maximum expected payoff. Of course, in order for HBA to traverse the tree and
calculate expected payoffs, the trajectories in the tree have to be finite. We will discuss
two different ways to implement HBA in the next chapter.
Where do the hypothesised types θ∗j ∈ Θ∗j come from? One way is to have them
specified manually by domain experts, based on their experience with the problem. We
chose this method in the case studies presented in Chapter 4. Another method to obtain
hypothesised types is to generate them automatically from the problem description. In
Chapters 6 and 8, we use three different methods to automatically generate sets of types
for any given matrix game. (The methods are specified in Appendix B.) Finally, one
may use machine learning methods such as the ones discussed in Section 2.3 to extract
types from a corpus of historical data (e.g. Barrett et al., 2013; Gal et al., 2004).
Chapter 4
Two Empirical Case Studies
The previous chapter laid out the formal framework within which we conduct our studies.
To further familiarise the reader with the concepts presented therein, this chapter will
discuss two empirical case studies. The case studies show two different ways in which
HBA can be implemented in practice. Moreover, they demonstrate that the idea of
utilising types has great potential in addressing ad hoc coordination.
The first case study discusses results from a human-machine experiment conducted at
the Royal Society Summer Science Exhibition 2012 in London. Therein, a large number
of human subjects played one of two simple games, Rock-Paper-Scissors and Prisoner’s
Dilemma, against HBA and alternative algorithms. HBA was implemented as a simple
forward-planning procedure which expands a full tree of all possible future trajectories
(up to a fixed depth). The results show that a handful (5 and 6, respectively) of simple
types were sufficient to achieve flexible and efficient interaction with humans which
exhibited a large variety of behaviours. Specifically, HBA achieved the same individual
average payoff as the alternative algorithms but outperformed them on important other
metrics, such as social welfare and winning rate.
In the second case study, we used HBA to solve complex coordination problems in
a simulated logistics domain. Here, a group of agents attempt to collect a number of
objects in a two-dimensional grid-world. Agents may differ in their ability to collect
objects, and their behaviours are initially unknown to us. We show how HBA can
be implemented as a reinforcement learning procedure to solve such problems. The
procedure uses a sampling-based planning routine to simulate interaction trajectories,
based on the hypothesised types and posterior beliefs. The results show that HBA
achieved significantly higher flexibility and efficiency than several alternative algorithms
which were based on the same general reinforcement learning framework.
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4.1 Human-Machine Experiment
In the first case study, we conducted a large human-machine experiment1 at the Royal
Society Summer Science Exhibition 20122 in London.
4.1.1 Experimental Setup
A large public exhibition such as this one is an excellent testbed environment for ad
hoc agents, since the visitors vary widely in aspects such as intelligence and behaviour.
However, in order to make statistically relevant comparisons, we required data from
many participants. Therefore, the games needed to be simple enough so participants
would understand them quickly, yet they also needed to be interesting in terms of
coordination strategies. Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) are
two widely-studied problems in game theory which have these properties (the payoff
matrices are shown in Table 4.1). In PD, the problem is that the only Nash equilibrium
(NE), and hence stable outcome, is at (D,D), while (C,C) is the only outcome that
has both the highest welfare (sum of payoffs) and fairness (product of payoffs) but is
unstable since the players could deviate to obtain higher immediate payoffs. In RPS, the
only NE is for all players to play randomly. However, even if humans attempt to play
randomly, they often fall back to patterns (Wagenaar, 1972) against which the other






R 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
P 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
S -1,1 1,-1 0,0
(b) Rock-Paper-Scissors
Table 4.1: Payoff matrices for Prisoner’s Dilemma and Rock-Paper-Scissors games. The
upper-case letters correspond to the actions available to the players. Each cell (ur,uc)
contains the payoffs to the row player (ur) and the column player (uc) if they choose the
corresponding actions. All payoffs are symmetric.
1Caveat: There is a long tradition of human experimentation in behavioural economics, with an
established methodology and protocols regarding sampling, mental bias, control groups, etc. of human
subjects. We realise that our experiment does not always follow such protocols and is perhaps somewhat
unprincipled in this regard. Nonetheless, we do believe that interaction with humans is an important part
of ad hoc coordination, and experiments such as this one constitute a step in this direction.
2http://sse.royalsociety.org/2012/exhibits/robotic-soccer
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Algorithm 3 Generic framework for tree-based planning
Repeat:
Observe current state st
For all ai ∈ Ai do:
Ω(ai) =
{
〈st ,at , ...,st+l,at+l〉 |ati = ai
}













Sample action ati ∼ argmaxai E(ai)
The alternative algorithms were Joint Action Learning (JAL) (Claus and Boutilier,
1998) for RPS, and Conditional Joint Action Learning (CJAL) (Banerjee and Sen, 2007)
for RPS. Both algorithms learn a model of the opponent’s behaviour by taking the
average frequency of the opponent’s past actions (similar to “fictitious play”; Brown,
1951). The difference is that JAL conditions the model only on the current system state
while CJAL conditions the model on the state and its own action choices. All algorithms,
including HBA, were implemented using the same generic framework (Algorithm 3).
The framework computes expected payoffs for all actions (E(ai)) by expanding a finite
tree of all future trajectories (Ω(ai)), where the trajectories are bounded in length by l∗
and t∗. We set l∗= 10 for PD, l∗= 1 for RPS, and t∗= 20 (the number of played rounds)
in both games. The function OPPSTRAT(sτ,aτ) returns the probability that players j 6= i
choose actions aτj in state s
τ. HBA implements this by averaging over all hypothesised
types in Θ∗j using its current posterior, and C/JAL do this using their learned actions
frequencies. While PD and RPS have no states, we found that the performance of C/JAL
could be further improved by introducing “artificial” states, which we simply defined as
st = at−1. (In the first round, C/JAL assumed the opponent to play randomly.)
Our hypothesis for the experiment was that the human would switch between sev-
eral simple behaviours, as opposed to having one complex behaviour. Therefore, we
modelled the problem as a SBG with a dynamic mixed type distribution (unknown to us)
which governed the type of the human, and we provided HBA with a small set of types,
specified in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, which we hypothesised the human could have. In order
to recognise changing types more effectively, HBA used temporally reweighted poste-
rior beliefs which we define in Section 4.1.2. Finally, HBA used uniform prior beliefs
and a general time weight (cf. Section 4.1.2) with a = 10, b = 0.05, and c = 3.
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PD type Definition
AlwaysC ati =C





TitFor2Tats a0,1i =C, a
t
i =C if a
t−1,t−2
j =C else D
Optimistic πi(C,Ht) = 1 if t < 2∨at−1j =C∨µ = 0 else 0.2+0.8σ
Pessimistic πi(D,Ht) = 1 if t < 2∨at−1j = D else 0.2+[µ > 0]10.8σ
where µ = ∑t−2τ=0[a
τ









Table 4.2: 5 PD types. [b]1 = 1 if b is true, else 0.
RPS type Definition
Copycat a0i ∼U(Ai), ati = a
t−1
j
RetryIfWon ati ∼U(Ai) if t = 0∨ui(at−1)< 0 else ati = a
t−1
i
i-focused(h) πi(ai,Ht) = g(ai,x)/∑âi∈Ai g(âi,x), x = min[t,h]
for h ∈ {1,2} where g(ai,x) = max
[
0, x−∑xτ=1[at−τi = ai]1(x+1− τ)
]
j-focused(h) ati ∼ argmaxai ∑a j∈A j π j(a j,H
t)ui(ai,a j)
for h ∈ {1,2} where π j(a j,Ht) is obtained using i-focused(h) for j
Table 4.3: 6 RPS types. U is uniform distribution. [b]1 = 1 if b is true, else 0.
The procedure of the experiment was as follows: First, we randomly sampled a
participant from the set of visitors which were currently at our exhibit (Figure 4.1). The
participant was then brought to a dedicated table with a chair and a laptop computer.
The laptop ran a programme, with an intuitive graphical user interface, which prompted
the participant to choose between PD and RPS. The rules of the games were explained
both textually in the programme and in person by one of our staff members to make sure
the participant understood the rules. The game was then played in two matches, each
lasting 20 rounds. One of the matches was against HBA and the other match against
C/JAL, but this was hidden from the participant and the order was chosen randomly.
The programme displayed the current match, round, and scores of all players, and also
allowed to display the rules at any time (Figure 4.2). At the end of each round, the
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(a) Our exhibit (b) Pool of test subjects
Figure 4.1: Royal Society Summer Science Exhibition 2012.
(a) Prisoner’s Dilemma (b) Rock-Paper-Scissors
Figure 4.2: Graphical user interfaces.
participant was shown the actions and scores of both players, and at the end of each
match, the participant was given a summary of the scores.
4.1.2 Temporally Reweighted Posteriors
A potential problem with the posterior defined by (3.7)/(3.8) is that it assigns zero
probability to a type θ j if π j(Ht ,atj,θ j) is zero for any t. This can be problematic for the
following reasons: If the game uses a dynamic or mixed type distribution (as we assume
in this experiment), and if Pr(θ j|Ht) = 0 for a type θ j that is not currently the true type
of player j, then Pr(θ j|Hτ) = 0 for all times τ > t, even if player j’s type changes to
θ j. Furthermore, if we have a hypothesised type θ∗j which approximates the true type
θ j of player j in a subset S∗ ⊂ S (i.e. π j(Ht ,a j,θ∗j)≈ π j(Ht ,a j,θ j) for st ∈ S∗), but not
outside S∗, then (3.7)/(3.8) might assign zero probability to θ∗j once player j leaves S
∗.
However, θ∗j may be the best approximation we have for S
∗, so it would be useful if
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Figure 4.3: General time weight. The y-axis shows the weight (upward direction is higher
weight) and the x-axis shows the time, with the most recent events on the left-hand side.
Different settings of the parameter c produce different weighting schemes (parameters a
and b are the same in all graphs). For c 6= 0, all past events after ξmax are assigned zero
weight and are hence ignored.
(3.7) was able to quickly reassign positive probability to θ∗j once player j returns to S
∗.
To address these problems, we use temporally reweighted posteriors:
Definition 10. A temporally reweighted posterior (TR-posterior) is defined as in (3.7)
where the likelihood L is defined as




f (t− τ)π j(Hτ,aτj,θ j) (4.1)
where f (ξ)≥ 0 and f (ξ)≥ f (ξ+1), for all ξ ∈ N+.
The function f is called the time weight and can assume various forms. An example
of a simple but useful time weight, called the general time weight, is given by f (ξ) =
max[0, a− b(ξ− 1)c] where a,b,c ∈ R+0 . This time weight can be used to produce
various behaviours, depending on the parameters a,b,c (Figure 4.3). In particular, it can
be used to give greater importance to more recent events, which means that HBA is able
to quickly reassign probabilities. However, the crucial aspect of (4.1) is that it defines a
sum rather than a product, which means that the problems described above do not occur.
4.1.3 Results
We collected data from 427 participants, of which 186 played PD and 241 played RPS.
The lowest and highest recorded ages were 9 and 72, respectively, with an average
age of approximately 17. In the following, all significance statements are based on






























































Figure 4.4: Results of the human-machine experiment. Circles and whiskers correspond
to mean, minimum, and maximum values, respectively. The welfare plot in (a) shows the
median value and 25%/75% percentiles.
paired t-tests with 5% significance level. Figures 4.4a and 4.4b show the results for
PD and RPS, respectively. In both games, the average total payoffs of HBA and C/JAL
were statistically equivalent. Since the time was fixed to 20 rounds, it means that they
achieved equal efficiency. This is, in fact, a positive result considering that C/JAL are
strong candidates in PD/RPS. In addition, as we will discuss in the following, HBA
behaved very differently from C/JAL, with beneficial side effects.
In PD, the most desirable long-term outcome is (C,C) since it is both welfare and
fairness optimal, and since it is a non-myopic equilibrium (Brams, 1993), meaning that
no player has a long-term incentive to deviate. With this in mind, we point out that in
over 28% of the games, HBA and the human played (C,C) in at least 50% of the final 10
rounds of the game, while CJAL did not achieve this in any game. Thus, HBA achieved
a significantly higher total welfare than CJAL (Figure 4.4a). This is despite the fact
that neither of them was optimised for social welfare. The reason for this is that HBA
was planning more accurately than CJAL. When computing the expected payoffs E(ai),
CJAL uses its learned action frequencies to obtain probabilities for each trajectory in
Ω(ai). However, these probabilities can only be accurate for states that have been visited
frequently enough. Moreover, if a player changes its behaviour, CJAL requires new
evidence from all states to accurately reflect the change. On the other hand, HBA uses
its posterior and types to compute probabilities of trajectories. Therefore, once HBA
has an accurate posterior, it can use the types to accurately plan in the entire state space
of the game, including unseen states. This also allows HBA to plan the effects of its
actions on the other player, which means that HBA may take actions to manipulate the
player’s decisions. Finally, if a player changes its behaviour, HBA only needs to update
its posterior, which requires much less information than the update in CJAL.
In RPS, the crucial questions is whether a player is winning or not. Interestingly,
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the winning rate of HBA (53.71%) was significantly higher than the winning rate of
JAL (43.98%), as shown in Figure 4.4b. While in PD the good performance of HBA
was due to its planning capabilities, in RPS this was not as relevant since the planning
horizon was limited to trajectories of length 1. Rather, HBA’s good performance was
due to the fact that it recognised changed behaviours faster than JAL. Indeed, in a game
such as RPS, it can be expected that the human players change frequently between
different strategies. This is confirmed by the statistics shown in Figure 4.4c, which show
the average number of types used by the human players and the average duration. The
statistics are based on HBA’s posterior beliefs, where the number of types for player i in
a play corresponds to the number q in 〈t0, t1, ..., tq〉, with t0 = 0 and tq = 20, for which
argmaxθi Pr(θi|Hτ)⊆ argmaxθi Pr(θi|Hτ+1) for all ty−1 ≤ τ < ty and y ∈ {1, ...,q}, and
where the average duration is 1q ∑y ty− ty−1. According to these statistics, the human
players had 4.45 types with a duration of 4.96 rounds in PD, and 8.25 types with a
duration of 2.46 rounds in RPS. Clearly, with a duration of only 2.46 rounds, planning
was not as important as recognising changed types. By using TR-posteriors, HBA was
able to do this effectively.
4.2 Simulated Experiments
In the second case study, we evaluated several configurations of HBA and alternative
algorithms in a complex logistics domain called level-based foraging.
4.2.1 Experimental Setup
A level-based foraging problem consists of a rectangular grid with n players and m
foods (Figure 4.5). Each field in the grid is either empty or occupied by one player or
one food. All players and foods have a level (∈ N+) where no food has a level greater
than the sum of any 4 players’ levels. A player can choose among 5 actions: N, E, S,
W , and load. The first 4 actions move the player into the corresponding direction if
the field is empty and inside the grid. A group of 1 to 4 players can load a food if they
are placed on fields next to the food and if the sum of their levels is at least as high as
the food’s level. A player which successfully loads a food obtains a payoff equal to
the level of the loaded food. At all other times, it receives a negative payoff of -0.01.
To avoid conflicts and keep this solvable, the foods are placed such that the Euclidean
distance between each of them is greater than 1, and no food is placed at any border
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(a) Every player can load a food (b) No player can load a food
Figure 4.5: Level-based foraging domain. Players are marked by circles and foods are
marked by squares (the respective levels are shown inside).
of the grid. The players’ goal is to collect all foods in minimal time, while also trying
to maximise their own payoffs. Since the players have different abilities (i.e. levels)
and are spatially distributed, this requires strong coordination of their behaviours. For
simplicity, we assume that the ad hoc agent knows the levels of all players and foods.
We specified 6 classes of types. The first 4 classes contain types with fixed behaviours
(i.e. they do not change over time). They each have a parameter σ which specifies the
radius of their sight: H1 always goes to the closest visible food. H2 goes to the one
visible food which is closest to the centre of all visible players. H3 always goes to the
closest visible food with compatible level (i.e. it can load it) and H4 goes to the one
visible food which is closest to all visible players such that the sum of their and H4’s
level is sufficient to load the food. H1–H4 try to load the food once they are next to
it. If they do not see a food, they move into a random direction. The final two classes
specify types with learning behaviours: Class 5 contains all instances of JAL and class
6 all instances of CJAL, as specified in the next paragraph.
We evaluated various configurations of HBA and three alternative algorithms: JAL
(Claus and Boutilier, 1998) learns the action frequencies of each player in each state
and uses them to compute expected action payoffs; CJAL (Banerjee and Sen, 2007) is
similar to JAL but learns the frequencies conditioned on its own actions; WoLF-PHC
(Bowling and Veloso, 2002) is a hill-climbing method in the space of mixed strategies.
The algorithms have been shown to exhibit different behaviours in ad hoc coordination
problems (Albrecht and Ramamoorthy, 2012).
A single framework (Algorithm 4) was used to implement each algorithm. The
framework uses a table Q to learn the expected long-term payoffs of joint actions,
similar to Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992). To accelerate learning, it uses an
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Algorithm 4 Reinforcement learning framework with sampling-based planning
Set Q(s,a)← 0 and e(s,a)← 0 for all (s,a) ∈ S×A
Repeat until st ∈ S̄:
Observe: current state st
With probability 1− ε1 set ati = CHOOSEACTION(st ), else sample ati ∼ Ai




Repeat x times: EXPAND(d,st+1,COPY(e))
EXPAND(d,s, ê):
Repeat d times or until s ∈ S̄:






δ = β(u+ γ maxâi EXPPAY(Q,s
′, âi)−Q(s,a))
ê(s,a)← 1
For all (ŝ, â) ∈ S×A s.t. ê(ŝ, â)≥ emin do:
Q(ŝ, â)← Q(ŝ, â)+δ ê(ŝ, â)
ê(ŝ, â)← λ ê(ŝ, â)
CHOOSEACTION(s):
Return ai ∼ argmaxâi EXPPAY(Q,s, âi)
eligibility trace e (Sutton and Barto, 1998) to connect current payoffs with past actions.
We assume that the agent has access to a simulator SIMULATE(s,a) which, based on
the transition (T ) and payoff (ui) functions of the game, returns a successor state s′ and
payoff u after taking joint action a in state s. This simulator is used in a sampling-based
planning procedure (Kearns et al., 2002) EXPAND(d,s, ê) which, starting in state s,
generates a future trajectory of length d and updates Q using the eligibility trace ê. The
function EXPPAY(Q,s,ai) computes the expected payoff for taking action ai in state
s based on Q, and the function OPPACTIONS(s) samples actions for all other players
j 6= i in state s. HBA implements EXPAND and OPPACTIONS using its posterior beliefs
and hypothesised types. C/JAL implement these functions using their learned action
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frequencies. For WoLF-PHC, the framework defines Q and e on S×Ai (rather than
S×A) and EXPPAY(Q,s,ai) is simply defined as Q(s,ai). Since WoLF-PHC does not
model its opponents, we implement OPPACTIONS the same way as in JAL. The function
CHOOSEACTION(s) is redefined to ai ∼ π(s), where π is the mixed strategy maintained
in WoLF-PHC (cf. Tables 5 and 6 in Bowling and Veloso, 2002).
All algorithms used identical parameters: β = .2, γ = .9, λ = .9, emin = .01, ε1 = 0,
ε2 = .2, x = 3, d = 20. For WoLF-PHC, we used learning rates δw(t) = (1000+ t10)
−1
and δl(t) = 2δw(t). For HBA, we used uniform prior beliefs P(θ∗j) = |Θ∗j |−1. To allow
HBA to recognise changing types, we used a general time weight with a = 10, b = .01,
c = 3 (cf. Section 4.1.2). In addition, to allow HBA to learn new types during the
interaction, we used conceptual types as defined in Section 4.2.2. Estimates of flexibility
and efficiency were computed using Algorithm 1 with i = 1, r1 = r2 = 1, K = 1000,
where we assumed a path to be non-terminating if it reached t = 1000. The initial states
in the foraging domain were generated with random positions and levels for all players
and foods, with the maximum level being equal to the number of players. All agents
were tested on the same sequence of games and random numbers.
4.2.2 Conceptual Types





j 6⊂ Θ∗j), then j might have a type which is unknown to HBA, causing its
expected payoffs to be inaccurate. In such cases, it would be useful if HBA was able to
learn new types from experience. A useful feature of HBA is that it can include methods
for opponent modelling (see Section 2.3) as a special kind of type in Θ∗j .
In this experiment, we use a combination of case-based reasoning (Gilboa and
Schmeidler, 2001) and fictitious play (Brown, 1951), called conceptual types. Con-
ceptual types are based on the observation that behaviours may not be specified on a
state-by-state basis but rather on abstractions of state spaces. That is, there may be some
world conceptualisation inherent in a behaviour. (Example of this are “information
sets” in extensive form games (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991b) and “feature vectors” in
reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998).) While the types in Θ∗j are used to
hypothesise behaviours directly, a conceptual type can be used to hypothesise a world
conceptualisation underlying a player’s behaviour. Combined with the observed actions
of the player, this can be used to make predictions for previously unseen states and
increase prediction accuracy for rarely visited states.
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Definition 11. A conceptual type (c-type) θcj for player j is a tuple (d j,r, f ), where
d j : S×S→ R+0 is a symmetric distance function for pairs of states, r ∈ R+ is a radius,
and f is a time weight (as defined in Section 4.1.2), with
π j(Ht ,a j,θcj) =
 |A j|
−1 if @τ < t : g(st ,sτ)> 0 else
η ∑aτ∈Ht :aτj=a j f (t− τ)g(s
t ,sτ)
(4.2)




and η is a normalisation constant such that
∑a j π j(H
t ,a j,θcj) = 1.
The function g is the hypothesised world conceptualisation for player j and mea-
sures how similar two states are from the perspective of player j (determined by d j
and r; examples are given in Section 4.2.3). The time weight f can be used to give
greater importance to recent events, which allow c-types to adapt quickly to changing
behaviours. Intuitively, π j(Ht ,a j,θcj) is the normalised sum of how often player j chose
action a j in states similar to the current state st (weighted by g) and how recent those
action choices were (weighted by f ). If no similar states have been encountered before,
then π j(Ht ,a j,θcj) prescribes a uniform distribution. Note that we can include multi-
ple c-types in Θ∗j , each corresponding to a different world conceptualisation, and the
posterior Pr j filters out those types which do not fit the observed behaviour.
4.2.3 Results
We first tested the effectiveness of TR-posteriors by simulating the two problem situa-
tions described in Section 4.1.2. All tests were run on a 8×8 grid with 2 players and 5
foods. In Figure 4.6a, we used Θ+2 = Θ
∗
2 = {H1–H4 |σ = ∞} and a dynamic pure type
distribution which changed the type of player 2 after every 10 to 20 time steps. In Fig-
ure 4.6b, we used Θ+2 = {H1–H4 |σ = 3,5,7}, Θ∗2 = {H1–H4 |σ = ∞} (i.e the types in
Θ∗2 were accurate only for subsets S
∗ ⊂ S) and a static pure type distribution. In both
cases, the efficiency of HBA was significantly higher when using a TR-posterior with
general time weight (Gtw) compared to both the default posterior defined in (3.7)/(3.8)
(Unl) and a default posterior which was limited to the 9 most recent events (Lim), which
is the same time frame used in Gtw. In Figure 4.6a, Gtw even achieved the same ef-
ficiency as a version of HBA which always knew the correct type of the other player
(Cor). All HBA agents achieved a perfect flexibility of 1.
We also tested HBA with 4 conceptual types θcj = (d
c
j ,r, f ) where f (ξ) = [ξ < 10]1
and r = 1. In the following, we write s.p j (s. fk) to refer to the position of player j (food







































































Figure 4.6: Results of simulated experiments, averaged over 1000 runs. Markers have
the same colour if the difference is statistically insignificant (based on paired t-test with
5% significance level). “Cor” is HBA with correct types, “Gtw” is HBA using TR-posterior
with general time weight, “Unl” is HBA with unlimited default posterior, and “Lim” is HBA
with default posterior limited to 9 most recent events.
fk) in state s, and we write fk ∈ s to say that food fk is available in state s. The distance
functions dcj are defined as
d1j (s1,s2) = [s1 6= s2]1 ∞ (4.3)
d2j (s1,s2) = [s1.p j 6= s2.p j ∨ ¬∀k : fk ∈ s1⇔ fk ∈ s2]1 ∞ (4.4)
d3j (s1,s2) = φ(s1.p j,s2.p j) + ∑




d4j (s1,s2) = d
3










µ = s1.p j +
1
2
(s2.p j− s1.p j) (4.8)
ωv = min[‖s1.pv, µ‖,‖s2.pv, µ‖] (4.9)
‖x1,x2‖ denotes the Euclidean distance between x1 and x2, and ∨ denotes the “exclusive
or” operator. Intuitively, d1j uses no abstraction; d
2
j specifies that two states are equivalent
if player j has the same position in both states and if all foods have the same status in both
states; d3j specifies that two states are more similar the closer player j’s position in the
states and the further a food is away from j if its status differs in the states; d4j is similar
to d3j but also takes into account the other players’ positions in the states. All tests were
run on a 8×8 grid with 2 players and 5 foods, using Θ+2 = {H1–H4,JAL,CJAL |σ = ∞}
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(each c = 1, ...,4 tested separately),
and a static pure type distribution. The results in Figure 4.6c show that HBA achieved
good efficiency (compared to Cor) using θ2j , while the other c-types were less efficient.
All HBA agents achieved statistically equivalent flexibilities of 0.86±0.01.
Finally, we tested HBA, JAL, CJAL, and WoLF-PHC on a 10×10 grid with 3 players
and 8 foods, using Θ+2,3 = {H1–H4,JAL,CJAL |σ = 5,7,9} and Θ∗2,3 = {H1–H4 |σ = ∞}.
To add more realism, players 2 and 3 were “defective” with probability 0.2, where a de-
fective player changed its type randomly every 10 to 30 time steps. While the potential
of HBA is demonstrated by Cor, it would also be useful to know the optimal solution to
the problem. However, with a complex problem such as this one, we were unable to
compute optimal solutions. Instead, we had 6 humans play the game in a graphical user
interface (each one played the full 1000 runs, distributed over 7 days at their own conve-
nience), where no human was familiar with the technical details of this work. We do
not necessarily claim that humans produce optimal solutions, but we expect them to per-
form consistently well in this setting. To cope with the increased problem size, we set
the planning power of the algorithms to x = 10 and d = 30 (cf. Algorithm 4).
The results (Figure 4.6d) show that HBA clearly outperformed all alternative algo-
rithms, with Unl and Gtw being over 100% and 200% more efficient, respectively. This
is despite the fact that the hypothesised types Θ∗2,3 did not include any true types of
the players. We also tested HBA with the c-types θ1j and θ
3
j (added separately to Θ
∗
2,3)
but found that the efficiency of HBA did not improve significantly. This is since C/JAL
learned similar behaviours to H1 and H3, which were already covered in Θ∗2,3. We found
that HBA’s posterior beliefs often assigned high probabilities to H1/3 when the true
type of the player was in fact C/JAL. Since H1/3 ignore other players, this means that
C/JAL did not effectively coordinate their behaviours with the other players. We found
similar results for WoLF-PHC. As was expected, the humans achieved high efficiency
(Figure 4.6d shows the best human) and outperformed even Cor. One reason for this
is the fact that the humans had much greater planning power than HBA. Lastly, HBA
achieved higher flexibilities (.83± .01) than JAL (.734), CJAL (.749), and WoLF-PHC
(.744), while the humans all achieved perfect flexibility (1.0).
Chapter 5
Correctness of Posterior Beliefs
A central aspect of the type-based methodology are the beliefs over types. Beginning
with some initial beliefs as to the relative likelihood of types, we compare the predictions
of types with the observed actions and update our beliefs to reflect the given evidence.
Associated with this process are a number of key questions. In particular, how may
evidence be incorporated into beliefs? And under what conditions will the beliefs be
correct? These questions are crucial since incorrect beliefs may lead to wrong predictions
and, thereby, to suboptimal actions.
This chapter addresses both questions. We consider three classes of type distribu-
tions to cover a broad spectrum of scenarios: pure distributions, in which all agents have
a fixed type; mixed distributions, in which types are randomly re-allocated; and corre-
lated distributions, in which type assignments may be correlated. Corresponding to these
classes, we consider three formulations of posterior beliefs, called the product, sum,
and correlated posteriors. Each formulation prescribes a different way to incorporate ev-
idence into beliefs. We provide theoretical conditions under which these formulations
produce correct beliefs, by which we mean that the beliefs converge to the true distri-
bution of types. In addition, we provide examples to show when they may fail. These
insights can be used to choose an appropriate posterior formulation.
Note that the results presented in this chapter pertain to semi ad hoc coordination,
in which the true types are a subset of the hypothesised types (see Chapter 3). This is
necessary because our definition of “correct” is with respect to the type distribution:
beliefs are said to be correct if they assign the same probabilities to true types as the
type distribution. Therefore, beliefs can only be correct if they can point to the types in
the support of the type distribution. The case in which beliefs cannot be correct, due to
incomplete or incorrect hypothesised types, is examined in Chapters 7 and 8.
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5.1 Preliminaries
This chapter is concerned with convergence and correctness of posterior beliefs. Recall
from Chapter 3 that the posterior belief that player j is of type θ∗j , given history H
t , is
defined as





where L(Ht |θ∗j) is the likelihood of history Ht if player j has type θ∗j (to be specified in
the following sections), and Pj is the prior belief that player j has type θ∗j . Unless ex-
plicitly stated otherwise in the theorems, prior beliefs may assign arbitrary probabilities.
The combined posterior Pr is defined as Pr(θ∗−i|Ht) = ∏ j 6=i Pr j(θ∗j |Ht).
The theorems in this chapter tell us if and under what conditions HBA will learn the
type distribution ϒ of the game. As noted earlier, for this to be a well-posed learning
problem, we have to assume that the posterior Pr can refer to the same elements as
the type distribution ϒ. Therefore, the results in this chapter pertain to semi ad hoc
coordination (cf. Section 3.4), in which the user knows that the true type space Θ+j is a
subset of (or equal to) the hypothesised type space Θ∗j . Formally, we assume:
Assumption 3. ∀ j 6= i : Θ+j ⊆Θ∗j
Finally, our analysis focuses on static type distributions, which we defined in Sec-
tion 3.1 as being independent of time. Recall that a type distribution is called pure if it
assigns all probability mass to a single type, otherwise it is called mixed.
5.2 Product Posterior
We begin our analysis with the product posterior:








This is the standard posterior formulation used in Bayesian games (e.g. Dekel et al.,
2004; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). Furthermore, it was used in Chapters 3 and 4 as the
“default” posterior formulation.
It can be shown that, under a pure type distribution and if HBA does not a priori
rule out any of the types in Θ∗j , then it will learn to make correct future predictions.
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Let H∞ be an infinite history with prefix Hτ, and denote by Pϒ(Hτ,H∞) and PPr(Hτ,H∞),
respectively, the true probability (based on ϒ) and the probability assigned by HBA
(based on Pr) that Hτ will continue as prescribed by H∞.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a SBG with a pure type distribution ϒ. If HBA uses a product
posterior and if the prior probabilities Pj are positive (i.e. ∀θ∗j ∈Θ∗j : Pj(θ∗j)> 0), then:
for any ε > 0, there is a time t from which (τ≥ t)
PPr(Hτ,H∞)(1− ε) ≤ Pϒ(Hτ,H∞) ≤ PPr(Hτ,H∞)(1+ ε) (5.3)
for all H∞ with Pϒ(Hτ,H∞)> 0.
Proof. Kalai and Lehrer (1993) studied a model which can be equivalently described
as a single-state SBG (i.e. |S|= 1) with a pure type distribution and product posterior.
They showed that, if the player’s assessment of future play is absolutely continuous
with respect to the true probabilities of future play (i.e. any event that has true positive
probability is assigned positive probability by the player), then (5.3) must hold. In
our case, absolute continuity always holds by Assumption 3 and the fact that the prior
probabilities Pj are positive, as well as the fact that the type distribution is pure (from
which we can infer that the true types always have positive posterior probability).
In this proof, we seek to extend the convergence result of Kalai and Lehrer (1993)
(henceforth KL) to multi-state SBGs with pure type distributions. Our strategy is to
translate a SBG Γ into a modified SBG Γ̂ which is equivalent to Γ in the sense that the
players behave identically, and which is compatible to the model used in KL in the
sense that the informational assumptions of KL ignore the differences. We achieve this
by introducing a new player nature, denoted ξ, which emulates the transitions of Γ in Γ̂.
Given a SBG Γ = (S,s0, S̄,N,Ai,Θi,ui,πi,T,ϒ), we define the modified SBG Γ̂ as
follows: Firstly, Γ̂ has only one state, which can be arbitrary since it has no effect. The
players in Γ̂ are N̂ = N ∪{ξ} where i ∈ N have the same actions and types as in Γ
(i.e. Ai and Θi), and where we define the actions and types of ξ to be Aξ = Θξ = S (i.e.
nature’s actions and types correspond to the states of Γ). The payoffs of ξ are always






0 τ = t,aξ 6≡ θξ
1 τ = t,aξ ≡ θξ
T (aτ−1
ξ
,(aτ−1i )i∈N ,aξ) τ > t
(5.4)
where Hτ is any history of length τ≥ t. (Hτ allows the players i ∈ N to use πt
ξ
for future
predictions about ξ’s actions. This will be necessary to establish equivalence of Γ̂ / Γ.)
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The purpose of ξ is to emulate the state transitions of Γ. Therefore, the modified
strategies π̂i and payoffs ûi of i ∈ N are now defined with respect to the actions and
types (since the current type of ξ determines its next action) of ξ.















i), where s is the only state of Γ̂ and a
t ∈ ×i∈N̂Ai.
Finally, Γ̂ uses two type distributions, ϒ and ϒξ, where ϒ is the type distribution of
Γ and ϒξ is defined as ϒξ(Ht ,θξ) = T (a
t−1
ξ
,(at−1i )i∈N ,θξ). If s
0 is the initial state of Γ,
then ϒξ(H0,θξ) = 1 for θξ ≡ s0.
The modified SBG Γ̂ proceeds as the original SBG Γ, except for the following
changes: (a) ϒ is used to sample the types for i∈N (as usual) while ϒξ is used to sample
the types for ξ; (b) Each player is informed about its own type and the type of ξ. This
completes the definition of Γ̂.
The modified SBG Γ̂ is equivalent to the original SBG Γ in the sense that the players
i ∈ N have identical behaviour in both SBGs. Since the players always know the type
of ξ, they also know the next action of ξ, which corresponds to knowing the current
state of the game. Furthermore, note that the strategy of ξ uses two time indices, t and τ,
which allow it to distinguish between the current time (τ = t) and a future time (τ > t).
This means that πt
ξ
can be used to compute expected payoffs in Γ̂ in the same way as
T is used to compute expected payoffs in Γ. In other words, the formulas (2) and (3)
can be modified in a straightforward manner by replacing the original components of Γ
with the modified components of Γ̂, yielding the same results. Finally, since Γ̂ uses the
same type distribution as Γ to sample types for i ∈ N, there are no differences in their
payoffs and strategies.
To complete the proof, we note that (a) and (b) are the only procedural differences
between the modified SBG and the model used in KL. However, since we specify that
the players always know the type of ξ, there is no need to learn the type distribution ϒξ,
hence (a) and (b) have no effect in KL. The important point is that KL assume a model
in which the players only interact with other players, but not with an environment. Since
we eliminated the environment by replacing it with a player ξ, this is precisely what
happens in the modified SBG. Therefore, the convergence result of KL carries over to
multi-state SBGs with pure type distributions.
Theorem 1 states that HBA will eventually make correct future predictions when
using a product posterior against a pure type distribution (assuming the prior beliefs
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are positive). However, there is a subtle but important asymmetry between making
correct future predictions and knowing the true type distribution: while the latter implies
the former, the reverse is not generally true. Therefore, while HBA is guaranteed to
make correct future predictions after some time, it is not guaranteed to learn the type
distribution of the game. The following example1 illustrates this:
Example 2. Consider the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game from Section 4.1. Assume
player 1 is controlled by HBA using a product posterior while player 2 has two potential
types, Θ+2 = {θλ=0.1,θλ=0.5}, which are assigned by some pure type distribution. The
two types choose action C if player 1 chose C in the previous round. Otherwise, with
probability λ, they will forever play action D. In this case, HBA will never know the
correct type with absolute certainty. Even if HBA chooses D and player 2 responds by
playing D indefinitely, there is still no certainty because λ > 0 in both types.
Finally, note that Theorem 1 pertains to pure type distributions only. The following
example shows that the product posterior may fail in SBGs with mixed type distributions:
Example 3. Consider a SBG with two players. Player 1 is controlled by HBA using
a product posterior while player 2 has two types, Θ+2 = {θA,θB}, which are assigned
by a mixed type distribution ϒ with ϒ(θA) = ϒ(θB) = 0.5. The type θA always chooses
action A while θB always chooses action B. In this case, there will be a time t after
which both types have been assigned at least once, and so both actions A and B have
been played at least once by player 2. This means that from time t and all subsequent
times τ≥ t, we have Pr2(θA|Hτ) = Pr2(θB|Hτ) = 0 (that is, Pr2 is undefined), and HBA
will fail to make correct future predictions.
5.3 Sum Posterior
We continue our analysis with the sum posterior:








The sum posterior was introduced in Chapter 4 (more precisely, a generalisation of
the sum posterior; see Section 4.1.2) to allow HBA to recognise changed types. In other
words, the purpose of the sum posterior is to learn mixed type distributions. It is easy to
1All examples in this chapter assume Θ∗j = Θ
+
j and uniform prior beliefs Pj(θ
∗
j) = |Θ∗j |−1.
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see that a sum posterior would indeed learn the mixed type distribution in Example 3.
However, we now give an example to show that, without additional requirements, the
sum posterior does not necessarily learn any (pure or mixed) type distribution:
Example 4. Consider a SBG with two players. Player 1 is controlled by HBA using
a sum posterior while player 2 has two types, Θ+2 = {θA,θAB}, which are assigned
by a pure type distribution ϒ with ϒ(θA) = 1. The type θA always chooses action A
while θAB chooses actions A and B with equal probability. While the product posterior
converges to the correct probabilities ϒ, the sum posterior converges to probabilities
〈23 ,
1
3〉, which is incorrect.
Note that this example can be readily modified to use a mixed type distribution,
with similar results. Therefore, we conclude that, without further assumptions, the sum
posterior does not necessarily learn any type distribution.
Under what condition is the sum posterior guaranteed to learn the true type distribu-
tion of the game? Consider the following two quantities, which can be computed from a
given history Ht :





















j ∈Θ∗j |π j(Hτ,aτj,θ∗j)> 0
}
(5.8)
where [b]1 = 1 if b is true, else 0.












where âτj ∈ argmaxa j π j(Hτ,a j,θ∗j).
Both quantities are bounded by 0 and 1. The average overlap describes the similarity
of the types, where AO j(Ht) = 0 means that player j’s types (on average) never chose
the same action in history Ht , whereas AO j(Ht) = 1 means that they behaved identically.
The average stochasticity describes the uncertainty of the types, where AS j(Ht) = 0
means that player j’s types (on average) were fully deterministic in the action choices
in history Ht , whereas AS j(Ht) = 1 means that they chose actions uniformly randomly.
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It can be shown that, if the average overlap and stochasticity of player j converge to
zero as t→ ∞, then the sum posterior is guaranteed to converge to any pure or mixed
type distribution:
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a SBG with a pure or mixed type distribution ϒ. If HBA uses a
sum posterior, then, for t → ∞: If AO j(Ht) = 0 and AS j(Ht) = 0 for all players j 6= i,
then Pr(θ−i|Ht) = ϒ(θ−i) for all θ−i ∈Θ+−i.
Proof. Throughout this proof, let t→ ∞. The sum posterior is defined as (5.1) where L
is defined as (5.6). Given the definition of L, both the numerator and the denominator in
(5.1) may be infinite. We invoke L’Hôpital’s rule which states that, in such cases, the
quotient u(t)v(t) is equal to the quotient
u′(t)
v′(t) of the respective derivatives with respect to
t. The derivative of L with respect to t is the average growth per time step, which in
general may depend on the history Ht of states and actions. The average growth of L is
L′(Ht |θ j) = ∑
a j∈A j
F(a j|Ht)π j(Ht ,a j,θ j) (5.10)
where
F(a j|Ht) = ∑
θ j∈Θ+j
ϒ(θ j)π j(Ht ,a j,θ j) (5.11)
is the probability of action a j after history Ht , with ϒ(θ j) being the marginal probabil-
ity that player j is assigned type θ j. As we will see shortly, we can make an asymptotic
growth prediction irrespective of Ht . Given that AO j(Ht) = 0, we can infer that when-
ever π j(Ht ,a j,θ∗j) > 0 for action a j and type θ
∗
j , then π j(H
t ,a j, θ̂∗j) = 0 for all other
types θ̂∗j 6= θ∗j with θ̂∗j ∈Θ∗j . Therefore, we can write (5.10) as
L′(Ht |θ j) = ϒ(θ j) ∑
a j∈A j
π j(Ht ,a j,θ j)2 (5.12)
Next, given that AS j(Ht) = 0, we know that there exists an action a j in (5.12) with
π j(Ht ,a j,θ j) = 1, and, therefore, we can conclude that L′(Ht |θ j) = ϒ(θ j). This shows
that the history Ht is irrelevant to the asymptotic growth rate of L. Finally, since
∑θ j∈Θ+j
ϒ(θ j) = 1, we know that the denominator in (5.1) will be 1, and we conclude
that Pr j(θ j|Ht) = ϒ(θ j).
Theorem 2 explains why the sum posterior converges to the correct type distribution
in Example 3. Since the types θA and θB always choose different actions and are
completely deterministic (i.e. the average overlap and stochasticity are always zero), the
sum posterior is guaranteed to converge to the type distribution. On the other hand, in
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Figure 5.1: Example run in random SBG with 2 players, 10 actions, and 100 states.
Player j has 3 reinforcement learning types with ε-greedy action selection (decreasing
linearly from ε = 0.7 at t = 1000, to ε = 0 at t = 2000). The error at time t is computed
as ∑θ j∈Θ+j |Pr j(θ j|H
t)−ϒ(θ j)|, where Pr j is the sum posterior.
Example 4 the types θA and θAB produce an overlap whenever action A is chosen, and
θAB is completely random. Therefore, the average overlap and stochasticity are always
positive, and an incorrect type distribution was learned.
The assumptions made in Theorem 2, namely that the average overlap and stochas-
ticity converge to zero, require practical justification. First of all, it is important to note
that it is only required that these converge to zero on average as t→ ∞. This means that
in the beginning there may be arbitrary overlap and stochasticity, as long as these go to
zero as the game proceeds. In fact, with respect to stochasticity, this is precisely how
the exploration-exploitation dilemma (Sutton and Barto, 1998) is solved in practice: In
the early stages, the agent randomises deliberately over its actions in order to obtain
more information about the environment (exploration) while, as the game proceeds, the
agent becomes gradually more deterministic in its action choices so as to maximise its
payoffs (exploitation). Typical mechanisms which implement this are ε-greedy and Soft-
max/Boltzmann exploration (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Figure 5.1 demonstrates this in a
SBG in which player j has 3 reinforcement learning types. The payoffs for the types
were such that the average overlap would eventually go to zero.
Regarding the average overlap converging to zero, we believe that this is a property
which should be guaranteed by design, for the following reason: If the hypothesised type
space Θ∗j is such that there is a constantly-high average overlap, then this means that
the types θ∗j ∈Θ∗j are in effect very similar. However, types which are very similar are
likely to produce very similar trajectories in the planning step of HBA (cf. Ĥ in (3.10)
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and (3.11)) and, therefore, constitute redundancy in both time and space. Therefore, we
believe it is advisable to use type spaces which have low average overlap.
5.4 Correlated Posterior
An implicit assumption in the definition of (5.1) is that the type distribution ϒ can
be represented as a product of n independent factors (one for each player), such that
ϒ(θ) = ∏ j ϒ j(θ j). Therefore, since the sum posterior is in the form of (5.1), it is in fact
only guaranteed to learn independent type distributions. This is opposed to correlated
type distributions, which cannot be represented as a product of n independent factors.
Correlated type distributions can be used to specify constraints on type combinations,
such as “player j can only have type θ j if player k has type θk”. The following example
demonstrates how the sum posterior fails to converge to a correlated type distribution:
Example 5. Consider a SBG with 3 players. Player 1 is controlled by HBA using a
sum posterior. Players 2 and 3 each have two types, Θ+2 = Θ
+
3 = {θA,θB}, which are
defined as in Example 3. The type distribution ϒ chooses types with probabilities
ϒ(θA,θB) = ϒ(θB,θA) = 0.5 and ϒ(θA,θA) = ϒ(θB,θB) = 0. In other words, player 2
can never have the same type as player 3. From the perspective of HBA, each type (and
hence action) is chosen with equal probability for both players. Thus, despite the fact
that there is zero overlap and stochasticity, the sum posterior will eventually assign
probability 0.25 to all constellations of types, which is incorrect. This means that HBA
fails to recognise that the other players never choose the same action.
In this section, we propose a posterior formulation which can learn any correlated
type distribution:










where P specifies prior beliefs over Θ∗−i (analogous to Pj) and η is a normaliser.
The correlated posterior is closely related to the sum posterior. In fact, it converges
to the correct type distribution under the same conditions as the sum posterior:
Theorem 3. Let Γ be a SBG with a correlated type distribution ϒ. If HBA uses the
correlated posterior, then, for t→ ∞: If AO j(Ht) = 0 and AS j(Ht) = 0 for all players
j 6= i, then Pr(θ−i|Ht) = ϒ(θ−i) for all θ−i ∈Θ+−i.
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Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.
It is easy to see that the correlated posterior would learn the correct type distribution
in Example 5. Note that, since it is guaranteed to learn any correlated type distribu-
tion, it is also guaranteed to learn any independent type distribution. Therefore, the
correlated posterior would also learn the correct type distribution in Example 3. This
means that the correlated posterior is complete in the sense that it covers the entire
spectrum of pure/mixed and independent/correlated type distributions. However, this
completeness comes at a higher computational complexity. While the sum posterior is
in O(nmax j |Θ∗j |) time and space, the correlated posterior is in O(max j |Θ∗j |n) time and
space. In practice, however, the time complexity can be reduced substantially by com-
puting the probabilities π j(Hτ,aτj,θ
∗
j) only once for each j and θ
∗
j ∈Θ∗j (as in the sum
posterior), and then reusing them in subsequent computations.
Chapter 6
Practical Impact of Prior Beliefs
The previous chapter was concerned with the evolution of posterior beliefs as we observe
more evidence. However, before we observe any evidence based on which to form our
posterior beliefs, we will have to make an initial judgement as to the relative likelihood
of types. This initial judgement is called the prior belief.
Given the lack of evidence, it may be tempting to use uniform prior beliefs in which
all types have equal probability. Indeed, the fact that beliefs can change rapidly after
only a few observations suggests that prior beliefs may have negligible effect. On the
other hand, there is a substantial body of work in the game theory literature arguing the
importance of prior beliefs (Dekel et al., 2004; Kalai and Lehrer, 1993; Jordan, 1991).
However, these works consider the impact of prior beliefs on equilibrium attainment,
whereas our interest is in the practical impact of prior beliefs, i.e. payoff maximisation.
Moreover, the game theory literature on this subject assumes that all players use the
same Bayesian reasoning over types, while we make no such assumption.
Thus, we are left with the following questions: Do prior beliefs have an impact on
our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term? If so, how? And, crucially, can we
automatically compute prior beliefs so as to improve our long-term performance?
To find answers to these questions, we conducted a comprehensive empirical study
which compared 10 methods to automatically compute prior beliefs from a given set of
types. The results show that prior beliefs can indeed have a significant impact on the
long-term performance, and that the depth of the planning horizon (i.e. how far we look
into the future) plays a central role. Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, we show that
automatic methods can compute prior beliefs with consistent performance effects across
a variety of scenarios. An implication of this is that prior beliefs could be eliminated as
a manual parameter and instead be computed automatically.
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6.1 Experimental Setup
This section describes the experimental setup used in our study.
6.1.1 Games
We used a comprehensive set of benchmark games introduced by Rapoport and Guyer
(1966), which consists of 78 repeated 2×2 matrix games (i.e. 2 players with 2 actions).
The games are strictly ordinal, meaning that each player ranks each of the 4 possible
outcomes from 1 (least preferred) to 4 (most preferred), and no two outcomes have
the same rank. Furthermore, the games are distinct in the sense that no game can be
obtained by transformation of any other game, which includes interchanging the rows,
columns, and players (and any combination thereof) in the payoff matrix of the game.
The games can be grouped into 21 no-conflict games and 57 conflict games. In a
no-conflict game, the two players have the same most preferred outcome, and so it is
relatively easy to arrive at a solution that is best for both players. In a conflict game,
the players disagree on the best outcome, hence they will have to find some form of a
compromise. A listing of all games is given in Appendix A.
6.1.2 Performance Criteria
Each play of a game was partitioned into time slices which consist of an equal number
of consecutive time steps. For each time slice, we measured the following performance
criteria:
Convergence: An agent converged in a time slice if its action probabilities in the time
slice did not deviate by more than 0.05 from its initial action probabilities in the
same time slice. Returns 1 (true) or 0 (false) for each agent.
Average payoff: Average of payoffs an agent received in the time slice. Returns value
in [1,4] for each agent.
Welfare and fairness: Average sum and product, respectively, of the joint payoffs
received in the time slice. Returns values in [2,8] and [1,16], respectively.
Game solutions: Tests if the averaged action probabilities of the agents (averaged
over the time slice) formed an approximate stage-game Nash equilibrium, Pareto
optimum, Welfare optimum, or Fairness optimum in the time slice. Returns 1
(true) or 0 (false) for each game solution.
6.1. Experimental Setup 57
Precise formal definitions of these performance criteria can be found in (Albrecht
and Ramamoorthy, 2012).
6.1.3 Algorithm
In this study, we used HBA to control player 1 and a single type in each interaction
to control player 2, which was always included in the set of hypothesised types Θ∗2
provided to HBA (discussed in detail in Section 6.1.6). Hence, we used the product
posterior formulation as defined in Section 5.2 to update HBA’s beliefs.
We implemented HBA similarly to Section 4.1 (Algorithm 3), by expanding a finite
tree of all future trajectories and weighting each trajectory using the posterior beliefs and
type predictions. Formally, HBA chooses an action ai which maximises the expected
payoff Eaih (H
t), defined as
Eaih (Ĥ) = ∑
θ∗j∈Θ∗j





Q(ai,a j)h (Ĥ) = ui(ai,a j)+
 0 if h = 0, elsemaxa′i Ea′ih (〈Ĥ,(ai,a j)〉) (6.2)
where h specifies the depth of the planning horizon (i.e. HBA predicts the next h
actions of player j). Note that Ht is the current history of joint actions while Ĥ is
used to construct all future trajectories in the game. The only difference between this
implementation and the one used in Section 4.1 is that the latter incorporated the total
number of rounds to be played while this implementation does not (that is, it plans its
actions irrespective of the remaining play time). This was done to avoid “end-game”
effects which could complicate the analysis.
Note that (6.1) and (6.2) correspond closely to (3.10) and (3.11), respectively. The
difference is that (6.1)/(6.2) use h to specify the planning depth while (3.10)/(3.11) use
the discount factor γ. Hence, a “deeper” planning horizon h translates into a greater
discount factor γ. All results reported in this chapter hold for both variants.
6.1.4 Types
We used three different methods to automatically generate parameterised sets of types
Θ∗j for any given game. The generated types cover a broad spectrum of adaptive be-
haviours, including deterministic (CDT), randomised (CNN), and hybrid (LFT) policies.
Algorithmic details and parameter settings are given in Appendix B.
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Leader-Follower-Trigger Agents (LFT)
Crandall (2014) described a method to automatically generate sets of “leader” and
“follower” agents which seek to play specific sequences of joint actions, called “target
solutions”. These solutions must satisfy certain requirements, such as that the average
payoffs of the solution exceed the safety (maximin) values of the players. A leader
agent plays its part of the target solution as long as the other player does. If the other
player deviates, the leader agent punishes the player by playing a minimax strategy.
The follower agent is similar except that it does not punish. Rather, if the other player
deviates, the follower agent randomly resets its position within the target solution and
continues play as usual. We augmented this set by a “trigger” agent which is similar
to the leader and follower agents, except that it plays its maximin strategy indefinitely
once the other player deviates.
Co-Evolved Decision Trees (CDT)
We used genetic programming (Koza, 1992) to automatically breed sets of decision
trees. A decision tree takes as input the past n actions of the other player (in our case,
n = 3) and deterministically returns an action to be played in response. (Note that, since
the tree is deterministic, it can infer what it played in the past given the other player’s
actions.) The breeding process is co-evolutional, meaning that two pools of trees are
bred concurrently (one for each player). In each evolution, a random selection of the
trees for player 1 is evaluated against a random selection of the trees for player 2. The
fitness criterion includes the payoffs generated by a tree as well as its dissimilarity to
other trees in the same pool. This was done to encourage a more diverse breeding of
trees, as otherwise the trees tend to become very similar or identical (this happens, for
example, when the breeding converges to a Nash equilibrium).
Co-Evolved Neural Networks (CNN)
We used a string-based genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) to breed sets of artificial
neural networks. The process is basically the same as the one used for decision trees.
However, the difference is that artificial neural networks can learn to play stochastic
strategies while decision trees always play deterministic strategies. Our networks consist
of one input layer with 4 nodes (one for each of the two previous actions of both players),
a hidden layer with 5 nodes, and an output layer with 1 node. The node in the output
layer specifies the probability of choosing action 1 (and, since we play 2× 2 games,
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of action 2). All nodes use a sigmoidal threshold function and are fully connected to
the nodes in the next layer. The evolution process places greater weight on mutation
than crossover, since the latter has a tendency to destroy learned behaviours in neural
networks rather than improve them.
6.1.5 Prior Beliefs
We specified a total of 10 different methods to automatically compute prior beliefs Pj
for a given set of types Θ∗j :
Uniform prior
The uniform prior sets Pj(θ∗j) = |Θ∗j |−1 for all θ∗j ∈Θ∗j . This is the baseline prior against
which the other priors are compared.
Random prior
The random prior specifies Pj(θ∗j) = .0001 for a random half of the types in Θ
∗
j . The
remaining probability mass is uniformly spread over the other half. The random prior is
used to check if the performance differences of the various priors may be purely due to




j) be the expected cumulative payoff to player k, from the start up until time t,
if player j (i.e. the other player) is of type θ∗j and player i (i.e. HBA) plays optimally
against it. Each value prior is in the general form of Pj(θ∗j) = ηψ(θ
∗
j)
b, where η is a
normalisation constant and b is a “booster” exponent used to magnify the differences
between types θ∗j . Based on this general form, we define four different value priors:
• Utility prior: ψU(θ∗j) =U ti (θ∗j)
• Stackelberg prior: ψS(θ∗j) =U tj(θ∗j)
• Welfare prior: ψW (θ∗j) =U ti (θ∗j)+U tj(θ∗j)
• Fairness prior: ψF(θ∗j) =U ti (θ∗j)∗U tj(θ∗j)
Our choice of value priors is motivated by the variety of metrics they cover. As a
result, these priors can produce substantially different probabilities for the same set of
types. In this study, we set t = 5 and b = 10.
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LP-priors
LP-priors are based on the idea that optimal priors can be formulated as the solution to
a mathematical optimisation problem (in this case, a linear program). Each LP-prior
generates a quadratic matrix A, where each element A j, j′ contains the “loss” that HBA
would incur if it planned its actions against the type θ∗j′ while the true type of player j








j) except that HBA believes that player j is
of type θ∗j′ instead of θ
∗
j . We define four different LP-priors:
• LP-Utility: A j, j′ = ψU(θ∗j)−U ti (θ∗j |θ∗j′)
• LP-Stackelberg: A j, j′ = ψS(θ∗j)−U tj(θ∗j |θ∗j′)










The matrix A can be fed into a linear program of the form minc cTx s.t. [z,A]x≤ 0,
with n = |Θ∗j |, c = (1,{0}
n)T , z = ({−1}n)T , to find a vector x = (l, p1, ..., pn) in which
l is the minimised expected loss to HBA when using the probabilities p1, ..., pn (one for
each type) as the prior belief Pj. In order to avoid premature elimination of types, we
furthermore require that pv > 0 for all 1≤ v≤ n. As before, we set t = 5 and b = 10.
While this is a mathematically rigorous formulation, it is important to note that it
is a simplification of how HBA really works. HBA uses the prior in every recursion
of its planning procedure, while the LP formulation implicitly assumes that HBA uses
the prior to randomly sample one of the types against which it then plans optimally.
Nonetheless, this is often a reasonable approximation.
6.1.6 Experimental Procedure
We performed identical experiments for every type generation method described in
Section 6.1.4. Each of the 78 games was played 10 times with different random seeds,
and each play was repeated against three opponents (30 plays in total):
1. (RT) A randomly generated type was used to control player 2 and the play lasted
100 rounds.
2. (FP) A fictitious player (Brown, 1951) was used to control player 2 and the play
lasted 10,000 rounds.
6.2. Results 61
3. (CFP) A conditioned fictitious player (which learns action distributions conditioned
on the previous joint action) was used to control player 2 and the play lasted
10,000 rounds.
In each play, we randomly generated 9 unique types and provided them to HBA along
with the true type of player 2, such that |Θ∗2|= 10. (In terms of our earlier definitions,
each play had a static pure type distribution; cf. Section 3.1) Thus, the true type of
player 2 was always included in the set of hypothesised types Θ∗2. To avoid “end-game”
effects, the players were unaware the number of rounds.
We included FP and CFP because they try to learn the behaviour of HBA. (While
the generated types are adaptive, they do not create models of HBA’s behaviour.) To
facilitate the learning, we allowed for 10,000 rounds. Finally, since FP and CFP will
always choose dominating actions if they exist (in which case there is no interaction),
we filtered out all games in the FP and CFP plays that had a dominating action for player
2 (leaving 15 no-conflict and 33 conflict games for the C/FP plays).
6.2 Results
A complete listing of all experimental results can be found in an appendix document
(Albrecht et al., 2015b). Based on this data, we make three main observations:
Observation 1. Prior beliefs can have a significant impact on the long-term perfor-
mance of HBA.
This was observed in all classes of types, against all classes of opponents, and in all
classes of games used in this study. Figure 6.1 provides three representative examples
from a range of scenarios. Many of the relative differences due to prior beliefs were
statistically significant, based on paired two-sided t-tests with a 5% significance level.
Our data explain this as follows: Different prior beliefs may cause HBA to take
different actions at the beginning of the game. These actions will shape the beliefs of
the other player (i.e. how it models and adapts to HBA’s actions) which in turn will
affect HBA’s next actions. Thus, if different prior beliefs lead to different initial actions,
they may lead to different play trajectories with different payoffs.
Given that there is a time after which HBA will know the true type of player 2
(since it is provided to HBA), it may seem surprising that this process would lead to
differences in the long-term. In fact, in our experiments, HBA often learned the true
type after only 3 to 5 rounds, and in most cases in under 20 rounds. After that point, if
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Time slice (each 100 steps)
(a) LFT (h=1) – CFP – No-Conflict
















Time slice (each 100 steps)
(b) CDT (h=3) – FP – Conflict




















Time slice (each 100 steps)
(c) CNN (h=5) – FP – Conflict































Figure 6.1: Prior beliefs can have significant impact on long-term performance.
Plots show average payoffs of player 1 (HBA). X(h)–Y–Z format: HBA used X types and
horizon h, player 2 was controlled by Y, and results are averaged over Z games.
the planning horizon of HBA is sufficiently deep, it will realise if its initial actions were
sub-optimal and if it can manipulate the play trajectory to achieve higher payoffs in the
long-term, thus diminishing the impact of prior beliefs.1
However, deep planning horizons can be problematic in practice since the time
complexity of HBA is exponential in the depth of the planning horizon. Therefore, the
planning horizon constitutes a trade-off between decision quality and computational
tractability. Interestingly, our data show that if we increase the depth, but stay below
a sufficient depth (“sufficient” as described above), it may also amplify the impact of
prior beliefs:
Observation 2. Deeper planning horizons can both diminish and amplify the impact of
prior beliefs.
1That is, provided that the other player’s behaviour can still be changed. This is not the case, for
instance, with trigger agents.
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Time slice (each 100 steps)
(a) h = 1















Time slice (each 100 steps)
(b) h = 3















Time slice (each 100 steps)
(c) h = 5































Figure 6.2: Deeper planning horizons can diminish impact of prior beliefs. Results
shown for HBA with LFT types, player 2 controlled by FP, averaged over no-conflict
games. h is depth of planning horizon (i.e. predicting h next actions of player 2).
Again, this was observed in all tested scenarios. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show examples
in which deeper planning horizons diminish and amplify the impact of prior beliefs,
respectively.
How can deeper planning horizons amplify the impact of prior beliefs? Our data
show that whether or not different prior beliefs cause HBA to take different initial
actions depends not only on the prior beliefs and types, but also on the depth of the
planning horizon. In some cases, differences between types (i.e. in their action choices)
may be less visible in the near future and more visible in the distant future. In such
cases, an HBA agent with a myopic planning horizon may choose the same (or similar)
initial actions, despite different prior beliefs, because the differences in the types may
not be visible within its planning horizon. On the other hand, an HBA agent with a
deeper planning horizon may see the differences between the types and decide to choose
different initial actions based on the prior beliefs.
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Time slice (each 5 steps)
(a) h = 1



















Time slice (each 5 steps)
(b) h = 3



















Time slice (each 5 steps)
(c) h = 5































Figure 6.3: Deeper planning horizons can amplify impact of prior beliefs. Results
shown for HBA with CNN types, player 2 controlled by RT, averaged over conflict games.
h is depth of planning horizon (i.e. predicting h next actions of player 2).
We now turn to a comparison between the different prior beliefs. Here, our data
reveal an intriguing property:
Observation 3. Automatic methods can compute prior beliefs with consistent perfor-
mance effects.
Figure 6.4 shows that the prior beliefs had consistent performance effects across a
wide variety of scenarios. For example, the Utility prior produced consistently higher
payoffs for player 1 (i.e. HBA) while the Stackelberg prior produced consistently higher
payoffs for player 2 as well as higher welfare and fairness. The Welfare and Fairness
priors were similar to the Stackelberg prior, but not quite as consistent. Similar results
were observed for the LP variants of the priors, despite the fact that the LP formulation
is a simplification of how HBA works (cf. Section 6.1.5).
We note that none of the prior beliefs, including the Uniform prior, produced high
rates for the game solutions (i.e. Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality, etc.). This is
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because we measured stage-game solutions, which have no notion of time. These can
be hard to attain in repeated games, especially if the other player does not actively seek
a specific solution, as was often the case in our study.
Observation 3 is intriguing because it indicates that prior beliefs could be eliminated
as a manual parameter and instead be computed automatically, using methods such
as the ones specified in Section 6.1.5. The fact that our methods produced consistent
results means that prior beliefs can be constructed to optimise specific performance
criteria. Note that this result is particularly interesting because the prior beliefs have no
influence, whatsoever, on the true type of player 2.
This observation is further supported by the fact that the Random prior did not
produce consistently different values (for any criterion) from the Uniform prior. This
means that the differences in the prior beliefs are not merely due to the fact that they
concentrate the probability mass on fewer types, but rather that the prior beliefs reflect
the intrinsic metrics based on which they are computed (e.g. player 1’s payoffs for
Utility prior, player 2’s payoffs for Stackelberg prior, etc.).
How is this phenomenon explained? We believe this may be an interesting analogy
to the “optimism in uncertainty” principle (e.g. Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2003). The
optimism lies in the fact that HBA commits to a specific class of types – those with high
prior belief – while, in truth and without further evidence, there is no reason to believe
that any one type is a priori more likely than others.
Each class of types is characterised by the intrinsic metric of the prior belief. For
instance, the Utility prior assigns high probability to those types which would yield
high payoffs to HBA if it played optimally against the types. By committing to such a
characterisation, HBA can effectively utilise Observation 1 by choosing initial actions
so as to shape the interaction to maximise the intrinsic metric. If the true type of player 2
is indeed in this class of types, then the interaction will proceed as planned by HBA and
the intrinsic metric will be optimised. However, if the true type is not in this class, then
HBA will quickly learn the correct type and adjust its play accordingly, albeit without
necessarily maximising the intrinsic metric.
This is in contrast to the Uniform and Random priors, which have no intrinsic
metric. Under these priors, HBA will plan its actions with respect to types which are not
characterised by a common theme (i.e., all types under the Uniform prior, and a random
half under the Random prior). Therefore, HBA cannot effectively utilise Observation 1.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.4: Automatic prior beliefs have consistent performance effects. Rows
show prior beliefs and columns show performance criteria. Each element (r,c) in the
matrix corresponds to the percentage of time slices in which the prior belief r produced
significantly higher values for the criterion c than the Uniform prior, averaged over all
plays in all tested games. All significance statements are based on paired right-sided
t-tests with a 5% significance level. See Figure 6.1 for X(h)–Y–Z format.
Chapter 7
Optimal Type Spaces
Perhaps the most obvious and crucial concern in the type-based methodology is the
fact that the hypothesised types may be incorrect. This can range from slight deviations
in predicted action probabilities, to predicting entirely different actions from what
was observed. In either case, such inaccuracies may have a significant impact on our
choice of actions: if the hypothesised types are incorrect, then our predictions of future
interactions may be incorrect, which in turn may lead to suboptimal action choices.
Therefore, an important question is what relation the hypothesised types must have to
the true types in order for HBA to be able to solve its task? In particular, what does it
mean for the hypothesised types to be optimal?
Given the complexity of behaviours agents may exhibit, this is an extremely difficult
question. In addition, it is not generally sufficient to consider types alone, since actions
are planned with respect to both types and beliefs over types. Rather, we have to consider
a stochastic process in which our actions depend on the correctness of types as well as
the evolution of our beliefs.
In this spirit, we describe a formal methodology whereby we compare two interactive
processes: one in which the true types are known, and one in which this knowledge is
approximated through beliefs over hypothesised types. Based on these processes, we use
a probabilistic temporal logic to define a hierarchy of desirable termination guarantees,
and analyse the theoretical conditions under which they are met. The main result of
this analysis is a novel characterisation of optimality which is based on the concept of
probabilistic bisimulation (Larsen and Skou, 1991). In addition to concisely defining
what constitutes optimality of hypothesised types, this allows the user to apply efficient
model checking algorithms to verify optimality in practice.
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7.1 Inaccurate Type Spaces
Each hypothesised type θ∗j in Θ
∗
j is a hypothesis by the user regarding how player j
might behave. Therefore, Θ∗j may be inaccurate in the sense that none of the types
therein accurately predict the observed behaviour of player j. This is demonstrated in
the following example:
Example 6. Consider a SBG with two players and actions L and R. Player 1 is controlled
by HBA while player 2 has a single type, θLR, which chooses L,R,L,R, etc. HBA is
provided with hypothesised types Θ∗j = {θ∗R,θ∗LRR}, where θ∗R always chooses R while
θ∗LRR chooses L,R,R,L,R,R etc. Both hypothesised types are inaccurate in the sense that
they predict player 2’s actions in only ≈ 50% of the game.
Two important theoretical questions in this context are how closely the hypothesised
type spaces Θ∗j have to approximate the true type spaces Θ
+
j in order for HBA to be able
to (1) solve the task (i.e. bring the SBG into a terminal state), and (2) achieve maximum
payoffs. These questions are closely related to the notions of flexibility and efficiency
(cf. Section 3.3) which, respectively, correspond to the probability of termination and
the average payoff per time step. In this chapter, we are primarily concerned with
question 1, and we are concerned with question 2 only insofar as we want to solve
the task in minimal time. (Since reducing the time until termination will increase the
average payoff per time step, i.e. efficiency.) This focus is formally captured by the
following assumption, which we make throughout this chapter:
Assumption 4. Let player i be controlled by HBA, then ui(s,a) = 1 iff. s ∈ S̄, else 0.
Assumption 4 specifies that we are only interested in reaching a terminal state, since
this is the only way to obtain a none-zero payoff. In our analysis, we consider discount
factors γ (cf. Algorithm 2) with γ = 1 and γ < 1. While all our results hold for both cases,
there is an important distinction: If γ = 1, then the expected payoffs (3.10) correspond
to the actual probability that the following state can lead to (or is) a terminal state (we
call this the success rate), whereas this is not necessarily the case if γ < 1. This is since
γ < 1 tends to prefer shorter paths, which means that actions with lower success rates
may be preferred if they lead to faster termination. Therefore, if γ = 1 then HBA is
solely interested in termination, and if γ < 1 then it is interested in fast termination,
where lower γ prefers faster termination.
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7.2 Methodology of Analysis
Given a SBG Γ, we define the ideal process, X , as the process induced by Γ in which
player i is controlled by HBA and in which HBA always knows the current and all
future types of all players. Then, given a posterior formulation Pr and hypothesised type
spaces Θ∗j for all j 6= i, we define the user process, Y , as the process induced by Γ in
which player i is controlled by HBA (same as in X) and in which HBA uses Pr and
Θ∗j in the usual way. Thus, the only difference between X and Y is that X can always
predict the player types whereas Y approximates this knowledge through Pr and Θ∗j .
We write Eaist (H
t |C) to denote the expected payoff (as defined by (3.10)) of action ai in
state st after history Ht , in process C ∈ {X ,Y}.
The idea is that X constitutes the ideal solution in the sense that Eaist (H
t |X) cor-
responds to the actual expected payoff, which means that HBA chooses the truly
best-possible actions in X . This is opposed to Eaist (H
t |Y ), which is merely the estimated
expected payoff based on Pr and Θ∗j , so that HBA may choose suboptimal actions in Y .
The methodology of our analysis is to specify what relation Y must have to X to satisfy
certain guarantees for termination.
We specify such guarantees in PCTL1 (Hansson and Jonsson, 1994), a probabilistic
modal logic which also allows for the specification of time constraints. PCTL expres-
sions are interpreted over infinite histories in labelled transition systems with atomic
propositions (i.e. Kripke structures). In order to interpret PCTL expressions over X and
Y , we make the following modifications without loss of generality: Firstly, any termi-
nal state s̄ ∈ S̄ is an absorbing state, meaning that if a process is in s̄, then the next state
will be s̄ with probability 1 and all players receive a zero payoff. Secondly, we intro-
duce the atomic proposition term and label each terminal state with it, so that term is
true in s if and only if s ∈ S̄.




where t ∈ N, p ∈ [0,1], and ∈ {>,≥}.
F≤tpterm specifies that, given a state s, with a probability of p a state s′ will be
reached from s within t time steps such that s′ satisfies term. The semantics of F<∞p term
is similar except that s′ will be reached in arbitrary but finite time. We write s |=C φ to
say that a state s satisfies the PCTL expression φ in process C ∈ {X ,Y}.
1PCTL stands for “Probabilistic real-time Computation Tree Logic” (Hansson and Jonsson, 1994).
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7.3 Critical Type Spaces
In the following section, we will sometimes assume that the hypothesised type spaces
Θ∗j are uncritical:
Definition 17. The hypothesised type spaces Θ∗j are critical if there is a set Sc ⊆ S\ S̄
which satisfies all of the following:
1. For each Ht ∈ H with st ∈ Sc, there is ai ∈ Ai such that Eaist (H
t |Y ) > 0 and
Eaist (H
t |X)> 0.
2. There is a positive probability that Y may eventually get into a state sc ∈ Sc from
the initial state s0.
3. If Y is in a state in Sc, then with probability 1 it will always be in a state in Sc (i.e.
it will never leave Sc).
We say Θ∗j are uncritical if they are not critical.
Intuitively, critical type spaces have the potential to lead HBA into a state space in
which it believes it chooses the right actions to solve the task, while other actions are
actually required to solve the task. The only effect that its actions have is to induce an
infinite cycle, due to a critical inconsistency between the hypothesised and true type
spaces. The following example demonstrates this:
Example 7. Recall Example 6 and let the task be to choose the same action as player j.
Then, Θ∗j is uncritical because HBA will always solve the task at t = 1, regardless of its
posterior beliefs and despite the fact that Θ∗j is inaccurate. Now, assume that Θ
∗
j = {θ∗RL}
where θ∗RL chooses actions R,L,R,L etc. Then, Θ
∗
j is critical since HBA will always
choose the opposite action of player j, thinking that it would solve the task, when a
different action would actually solve it.
A practical way to ensure that the type spaces Θ∗j are (eventually) uncritical is to
include methods for opponent modelling in each Θ∗j , such as the “conceptual types” in
Chapter 4 (cf. Section 4.2.2). If the opponent models are guaranteed to learn the correct
behaviours, then the type spaces Θ∗j are guaranteed to become uncritical. In Example 7,
any standard modelling method would eventually learn that the true strategy of player
j is θLR. As the model becomes more accurate, the posterior beliefs gradually shift
towards it and eventually allow HBA to take the right action.
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7.4 Termination Guarantees
We will now define a series of increasingly desirable termination guarantees using the
definitions of the previous sections, and show under what conditions they hold.
7.4.1 Guarantee 1
Our first termination guarantee states that if X has a positive probability of solving the
task, then so does Y :
Property 1. s0 |=X F<∞>0 term ⇒ s0 |=Y F
<∞
>0 term
We can show that Property 1 holds if the hypothesised type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical
and if Y only chooses actions for player i with positive expected payoff in X .
Let A(Ht |C) denote the set of actions that process C may choose from in state st
after history Ht , i.e. A(Ht |C) = argmaxai E
ai
st (H
t |C) (cf. step 3 in Algorithm 2).
Theorem 4. Property 1 holds if Θ∗j are uncritical and
∀Ht∈H ∀ai ∈ A(Ht |Y ) : Eaist (H
t |X)> 0 (7.2)
Proof. Assume s0 |=X F<∞>0 term. Then, we know that X chooses actions ai which may
lead into a state s′ such that s′ |=X F<∞>0 term, and the same holds for all such states
s′. Now, given (7.2) it is tempting to infer the same result for Y , since Y only chooses
actions ai which have positive expected payoff in X and, therefore, could truly lead
into a terminal state. However, (7.2) alone is not sufficient to infer s′ |=Y F<∞>0 term
because of the special case in which Y chooses actions ai such that E
ai
st (H
t |X)> 0 but
without ever reaching a terminal state. This is why we require that the hypothesised
type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical, which prevents this special case. Thus, we can infer that
s′ |=Y F<∞>0 term, and, hence, Property 1 holds.
7.4.2 Guarantee 2
The second guarantee states that if X always solves the task, then so does Y :
Property 2. s0 |=X F<∞≥1 term ⇒ s0 |=Y F
<∞
≥1 term
We can show that Property 2 holds if the type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical and if Y only
chooses actions for player i which lead to states into which X may get as well.
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Let µ(Ht ,s|C) be the probability that process C transitions into state s from state st
after history Ht , i.e.




T (st ,〈ai,a−i〉,s) ∏
j 6=i
π j(Ht ,a j,θtj) (7.3)
with A≡ A(Ht |C), and let µ(Ht ,S′|C) = ∑s∈S′ µ(Ht ,s|C) for S′ ⊂ S.
Theorem 5. Property 2 holds if Θ∗j are uncritical and
∀Ht∈H ∀s ∈ S : µ(Ht ,s|Y )> 0⇒ µ(Ht ,s|X)> 0 (7.4)
Proof. The fact that s0 |=X F<∞≥1 term means that, throughout the process, X only transi-
tions into states s with s |=X F<∞≥1 term. As before, it is tempting to infer the same result
for Y based on (7.4), since it only transitions into states which have maximum success
rate in X . However, (7.4) alone is not sufficient since Y may choose actions such that
(7.4) holds true but Y will never reach a terminal state. Nevertheless, since the hypothe-
sised type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical, we know that this special case will not occur, and,
thus, Property 2 holds.
We note that, in both Properties 1 and 2, the reverse direction holds true regardless
of Theorems 4 and 5. Furthermore, we can combine the requirements of Theorems 4
and 5 to ensure that both properties hold.
7.4.3 Guarantee 3
The third guarantee subsumes the previous guarantees by stating that X and Y have the
same minimum probability of solving the task:
Property 3. s0 |=X F<∞≥p term ⇒ s0 |=Y F<∞≥p term
We can show that Property 3 holds if the hypothesised type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical
and if Y only chooses actions for player i which X might have chosen as well.
Let R(ai,Ht |C) be the success rate of action ai, formally R(ai,Ht |C) = Eaist (H
t |C)
with γ = 1 (so that it corresponds to the actual probability with which ai may lead to
termination in the future). Define Xmin and Xmax to be the processes which for each
Ht choose actions ai ∈ A(Ht |X) with, respectively, minimal and maximal success rate
R(ai,Ht |X).
Theorem 6. If Θ∗j are uncritical and
∀Ht∈H : A(Ht |Y )⊆ A(Ht |X) (7.5)
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then
(i) for γ = 1: Proposition 3 holds in both directions
(ii) for γ < 1: s0 |=X F<∞≥p term ⇒ s0 |=Y F<∞≥p′ term
with pmin ≤ q≤ pmax for q ∈ {p, p′}, where pmin and pmax are the highest probabil-
ities such that s0 |=Xmin F<∞≥pminterm and s
0 |=Xmax F<∞≥pmaxterm.
Proof. (i): Since γ = 1, all actions ai ∈ A(Ht |X) have the same success rate for a given
Ht , and given (7.5) we know that Y ’s actions always have the same success rate as X’s
actions. Provided that the type spaces Θ∗j are uncritical, we can conclude that Property 3
must hold, and for the same reasons the reverse direction must hold as well.
(ii): Since γ < 1, the actions ai ∈ A(Ht |X) may have different success rates. The
lowest and highest chances that X solves the task are precisely modelled by Xmin and
Xmax, and given (7.5) and the fact that Θ∗j are uncritical, the same holds for Y . Therefore,
we can infer the common bound pmin ≤ {p, p′} ≤ pmax as defined in Theorem 6.
7.4.4 Guarantee 4 (Strong Optimality)
Properties 1 to 3 are indefinite in the sense that they make no restrictions on time
requirements. Our fourth and final guarantee subsumes all previous guarantees and
states that if there is a probability p such that X terminates within t time steps, then so
does Y for the same p and t:
Property 4. s0 |=X F≤t≥pterm ⇒ s0 |=Y F
≤t
≥pterm
We believe that Property 4 is an adequate criterion of optimality for hypothesised
type spaces Θ∗j since, if it holds, Θ
∗
j must approximate the true type spaces Θ
+
j in a way
which allows HBA to plan (almost) as accurately — in terms of solving the task — as
the “ideal” HBA in X which always knows the true types.
What relation must Y have to X in order to satisfy Property 4? The fact that Y and X
are processes over state transition systems means that we can draw on methods from the
model checking literature to answer this question. Specifically, we will use the concept
of probabilistic bisimulation (Larsen and Skou, 1991), which we here define within the
context of our work:
Definition 18. A probabilistic bisimulation between X and Y is an equivalence relation
B⊆ S×S such that
(i) (s0,s0) ∈ B
(ii) sX |=X term⇔ sY |=Y term for all (sX ,sY ) ∈ B
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(iii) µ(HtX , Ŝ|X) = µ(HtY , Ŝ|Y ) for any histories HtX ,HtY with (stX ,stY ) ∈ B and all
equivalence classes Ŝ under B.
Intuitively, a probabilistic bisimulation states that X and Y do (on average) match
each other’s transitions. Our definition of probabilistic bisimulation is most general in
that it does not require that transitions are matched by the same action or that related
states satisfy the same atomic propositions other than termination. However, we do note
that other definitions exist which make such additional requirements, and our results
hold for each of these refinements.
The main contribution in this chapter is to show that the optimality criterion ex-
pressed by Property 4 holds in both directions if there exists a probabilistic bisimulation
between X and Y . Thus, we offer an alternative formal characterisation of optimality
for the hypothesised type spaces Θ∗j :
Theorem 7. Property 4 holds in both directions if there is a probabilistic bisimulation
between X and Y .
Proof. First of all, we note that, strictly speaking, the standard definitions of bisimulation
(e.g. Baier, 1996; Larsen and Skou, 1991) assume the Markov property, which means that
the next state of a process depends only on the current state of the process. In contrast,
we consider the more general case in which the next state may depend on the history
Ht of previous states and joint actions (since the player strategies π j depend on Ht).
However, one can always enforce the Markov property by design, i.e. by augmenting the
state space S to account for the relevant factors of the past. In fact, we could postulate
that the histories as a whole constitute the states of the system, i.e. S =H. Therefore,
to simplify the exposition, we assume the Markov property and we write µ(s, Ŝ|C) to
denote the cumulative probability that C transitions from state s into any state in Ŝ.
Given the Markov property, the fact that B is an equivalence relation, and µ(sX , Ŝ|X)=
µ(sY , Ŝ|Y ) for (sX ,sY ) ∈ B, we can represent the dynamics of X and Y in a common














The nodes correspond to the equivalence classes under B. A directed edge from Ŝa
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to Ŝb specifies that there is a positive probability µab = µ(sX , Ŝb|X) = µ(sY , Ŝb|Y ) that X
and Y transition from states sX ,sY ∈ Ŝa to states s′X ,s′Y ∈ Ŝb. Note that sX ,sY and s′X ,s′Y
need not be equal but merely equivalent, i.e. (sX ,sY ) ∈ B and (s′X ,s′Y ) ∈ B. There is one
node (Ŝ0) that contains the initial state s0 and one node (Ŝ6) that contains all terminal
states S̄ and no other states. This is because once X and Y reach a terminal state they
will always stay in it (i.e. µ(s, S̄|X) = µ(s, S̄|Y ) = 1 for s ∈ S̄) and since they are the only
states that satisfy term. Thus, the graph starts in Ŝ0 and terminates (if at all) in Ŝ6.
Since the graph represents the dynamics of both X and Y , it is easy to see that
Property 4 must hold in both directions. In particular, the probabilities that X and Y are
in node Ŝ at time t are identical. One simply needs to add the probabilities of all directed
paths of length t which end in Ŝ (provided that such paths exist), where the probability
of a path is the product of the µab along the path. Therefore, X and Y terminate with
equal probability, and on average within the same number of time steps.
Some remarks to clarify the usefulness of this result: First of all, in contrast to
Theorems 4 to 6, Theorem 7 does not explicitly require Θ∗j to be uncritical. In fact,
this is implicit in the definition of probabilistic bisimulation. Moreover, while the other
theorems relate Y and X for identical histories Ht , Theorem 7 relates Y and X for related
histories HtY and H
t
X , making it more generally applicable. Finally, Theorem 7 has an
important practical implication: it tells us that we can use efficient methods for model
checking (e.g. Baier, 1996; Larsen and Skou, 1991) to verify optimality of Θ∗j . In fact,
it can be shown that for Property 4 to hold (albeit not in the other direction) it suffices
that Y be a probabilistic simulation (Baier, 1996) of X , which is a coarser preorder than
probabilistic bisimulation. However, algorithms for checking probabilistic simulation
(e.g. Baier, 1996) are computationally much more expensive (and fewer) than those for




In the previous chapter, we considered the possibility of incorrect hypothesised types
and analysed the conditions under which HBA is still able to solve its task, despite the
incorrectness of types. While the analysis is rigorous and complete, it is performed
before any interaction and with respect to the true types of other agents. How can we
decide during the interaction whether to trust our hypothesised types?
There are several ways in which an answer to this question could be utilised. For
example, if we persistently reject our hypothesised types, we may hypothesise an alter-
native set of types or resort to some default plan of action, such as a “maximin” strategy.
Unfortunately, posterior beliefs do not provide an answer to this question because they
quantify the relative likelihood of types (relative to a set of alternative types), but they
are no measure of truth. That is, even if our beliefs point to one type, this does not tell
us that the observed agent is indeed of that type. Instead, it only tells us that all other
types have been discarded after the current interaction history.
In this chapter, we propose an automated statistical analysis to address this question.
The analysis can be applied to individual types or to the combination of beliefs and
types. By sampling “hypothetical” actions at each point in time, we can formulate the
two-sample problem of whether the hypothetical and real actions were generated by
the same type. We present an algorithm which decides this problem in the form of a
frequentist hypothesis test. The algorithm can incorporate multiple statistical criteria
into the test statistic and learns its distribution during the interaction, with asymptotic
correctness guarantees. Analogous to standard frequentist testing, the hypothesis is
rejected at a given point in time if the resulting p-value is below some “significance
level”. We present results from a comprehensive set of experiments, demonstrating that
the algorithm achieves high accuracy and scalability at low computational costs.
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8.1 The Difficulty of Behavioural Hypothesis Testing
Deciding whether a behavioural hypothesis is incorrect can be an extremely difficult
problem. To illustrate the source of difficulty, consider an interaction process between
two agents which can choose from three actions. Table 8.1 shows the first 5 time steps
of the interaction. The columns show, respectively, the current time t of the interaction,
the actions chosen by the agents at time t, and agent 1’s hypothesised probabilities with






1 (1,2) 〈.3, .1, .6〉
2 (3,1) 〈.2, .3, .5〉
3 (2,3) 〈.7, .1, .2〉
4 (2,3) 〈.0, .4, .6〉
5 (1,2) 〈.4, .2, .4〉
Table 8.1: Beginning of interaction process.
Assuming the process continues in this fashion, and without any restrictions on the
behaviour of agent 2, how should agent 1 decide whether or not to reject its hypothesis
about the behaviour of agent 2? Note that agent 1 cannot outright reject its hypothesis
because all observed actions of agent 2 were supported by agent 1’s hypothesis.
A natural way to address this question is to compute some kind of score from the
information given in the above table, and to compare this score with some manually
chosen rejecting threshold. A prominent example of such a score is the empirical
frequency distribution (e.g. Conitzer and Sandholm, 2007; Foster and Young, 2003).
However, while the simplicity of this method is appealing, there are two significant
problems: (1) it is far from trivial to devise a scoring scheme that reliably quantifies
“correctness” of hypotheses (for instance, an empirical frequency distribution taken over
all past actions would be insufficient in the above example since the hypothesised action
distributions are changing), and (2) it is unclear how one should choose the threshold
parameter for any given scoring scheme.
In this chapter, we present an efficient algorithm which decides this question in
the form of a frequentist hypothesis test. The algorithm addresses (1) by allowing
for multiple scoring criteria in the construction of the test statistic, with the intent of
obtaining an overall more reliable scoring scheme. The distribution of the test statistic is
learned during the interaction process, and we show that the learning is asymptotically
8.2. Individual Hypotheses and Beliefs 79
correct. Analogous to standard frequentist testing, the hypothesis is rejected at a given
point in time if the resulting p-value is below some “significance level”. This eliminates
(2) by providing a uniform semantics for rejection that is invariant to the employed
scoring scheme.
Of course, there is a long-standing debate on the role of statistical hypothesis tests
and quantities such as p-values (e.g. Gelman and Shalizi, 2013; Berger and Sellke, 1987;
Cox, 1977). The usual consensus is that p-values should be combined with other forms
of evidence to reach a final conclusion (Fisher, 1935), and this is the view we adopt as
well. In this sense, our method may be used as part of a larger machinery to decide the
truth of a hypothesis.
8.2 Individual Hypotheses and Beliefs
Recall from Chapter 3 that π j(Ht ,a j,θ j) denotes the probability with which player j
chooses action a j ∈ A j after the interaction history Ht , if player j is of type θ j ∈ Θ j.
Furthermore, recall that we use a set Θ∗j ⊂Θ j of hypothesised types θ∗j ∈Θ∗j over which
we maintain posterior beliefs (probabilities) Pr j(θ∗j |Ht).
As noted in Chapter 7, it does not generally suffice to consider the correctness of
individual types, since we plan our actions with respect to both types and our beliefs
regarding the relative likelihood of types (cf. (3.10)). In this regard, we note that any
combination of beliefs Pr and types Θ∗j can be described as a single type θ̂
∗
j of the form
π j(Ht ,a j, θ̂∗j) = ∑
θ∗j∈Θ∗j
Pr(θ∗j |Ht)π j(Ht ,a j,θ∗j). (8.1)
This combination is equivalent to sampling a single type θ∗j ∈Θ∗j using probabilities
Pr(θ∗j |Ht), and then using θ∗j to choose actions a j ∈ A j via π j(Ht ,a j,θ∗j) (Kuhn, 1953).
Analogously, we may combine the true types Θ+j ⊂ Θ j of player j, using the type
distribution ϒ, as a single type θ̂+j such that







t ,a j,θ+j ). (8.2)
Therefore, to simplify the notation in this chapter, we will generally assume a single
hypothesised type θ∗j ∈ Θ j and a single true type θ
+
j ∈ Θ j. Note that this means that
our method can be applied to the combination of beliefs and hypothesised types, as
well as to individual types in Θ∗j . Furthermore, we will write π j(H
t ,θ j) to denote the
probability distribution over actions A j (rather than probabilities of individual actions).
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8.3 A Method for Behavioural Hypothesis Testing
Let i denote our agent and let j denote another agent. Moreover, let θ∗j ∈ Θ j denote
our hypothesis for j’s behaviour and let θ+j ∈Θ j denote j’s true behaviour. The central
question we ask is if θ∗j = θ
+
j ?
Unfortunately, since we do not know θ+j , we cannot directly answer this question.




j ) which were gener-
ated by θ+j . If we use θ
∗




j , ..., â
t−1
j ), where â
τ
j is sampled
using π j(Hτ,θ∗j), we can formulate the related two-sample problem of whether atj and
âtj were generated from the same behaviour, namely θ∗j .
In this section, we propose a general and efficient algorithm to decide this problem.
At its core, the algorithm computes a frequentist p-value
p = P
(
|T(ãtj, âtj)| ≥ |T(atj, âtj)|
)
(8.3)
where ãtj ∼ δt(θ∗j) =
(
π j(H0,θ∗j), ...,π j(H
t−1,θ∗j)
)
. The value of p corresponds to
the probability with which we expect to observe a test statistic at least as extreme as
T(atj, â
t




j . Thus, we reject θ
∗
j if p is below some
“significance level” α∗.
In the following subsections, we describe the test statistic T and its asymptotic
properties, and how our algorithm learns the distribution of T(ãtj, â
t
j). A summary of
the algorithm is given in Algorithm 5.
8.3.1 Test Statistic
We follow the general approach outlined in Section 8.1 by which we compute a score
from a vector of actions and their hypothesised distributions. Formally, we define a score
function as z : (A j)t ×∆(A j)t → R, where ∆(A j) is the set of all probability distribu-
tions over A j. Thus, z(atj,δ
t(θ∗j)) is the score for observed actions atj and hypothesised
distributions δt(θ∗j), and we sometimes abbreviate this to z(atj,θ
∗
j). We use Z to denote
the space of all score functions.



















where ãτj and â
τ
j are the τ-prefixes of ãtj and â
t
j, respectively.
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Algorithm 5 Automatic behavioural hypothesis testing
Input: history Ht (including observed action at−1j )
Output: p-value (reject θ∗j if p below some threshold α∗)
Parameters: hypothesis θ∗j ; score functions z1, ...,zK; N > 0






Sample ât−1j ∼ π j(Ht−1,θ∗j); set â
t
j← 〈ât−1j , â
t−1
j 〉
for n = 1, ...,N do








// Fit skew-normal distribution f





j) | n = 1, ...,N
}
Fit ξ,ω,β to D, e.g. using (8.14)
Find mode µ from ξ,ω,β
end if
// Compute p-value
Compute q← T(atj, â
t
j) using (8.4)/(8.7)
return p← f (q | ξ,ω,β) / f (µ | ξ,ω,β)
In this work, we assume that z is provided by the user. While formally unnecessary
(in the sense that our analysis does not require it), we find it a useful design guideline to
interpret a score as a kind of likelihood, such that higher scores suggest higher likelihood
of θ∗j being correct. Under this interpretation, a minimum requirement for z should be
that it is consistent, such that, for any t > 0 and θ∗j ∈Θ j,
θ
∗









where Eη denotes the expectation under η. This ensures that if the null-hypothesis
θ∗j = θ
+




j) is maximised on expectation.
Ideally, we would like a score function z which is perfect in that it is consistent
and |Πz|= 1. This means that θ∗j can maximise z(atj,θ∗j) (where atj ∼ δt(θ
+
j )) only if
θ∗j = θ
+
j . Unfortunately, it is unclear if such a score function exists for the general case
and how it should look. Even if we restrict the behaviours agents may exhibit, it can still
be difficult to find a perfect score function. On the other hand, it is a relatively simple
task to specify a small set of score functions z1, ...,zK which are consistent but imperfect.
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(Examples are given in Section 8.4.) Given that these score functions are consistent, we
know that the cardinality |∩k Πzk | can only monotonically decrease. Therefore, it seems
a reasonable approach to combine multiple imperfect score functions in an attempt to
approximate a perfect score function.
Of course, we could simply define z as a linear (or otherwise) combination of
z1, ...,zK . However, this approach is at risk of losing information from the individual
scores, e.g. due to commutativity and other properties of the combination. Thus, we
instead propose to compare the scores individually. Given score functions z1, ...,zK ∈ Z














where wk ∈ R is a weight for score function zk. In this work, we set wk = 1K . (We also
experiment with alternative weighting schemes in Section 8.4.) However, we believe
that wk may serve as an interface for useful modifications of our algorithm. For example,
Yue et al. (2010) compute weights to increase the power of their hypothesis tests.
8.3.2 Asymptotic Properties
The vectors atj and â
t
j are constructed iteratively. That is, at time t, we observe agent j’s
past action at−1j , which was generated from π j(H







the same time, we sample an action ât−1j using π j(H
t−1,θ∗j) and set â
t
j = 〈ât−1j , â
t−1
j 〉.
Assuming the null-hypothesis θ∗j = θ
+




j) converge in the process?
Unfortunately, T might not converge. This may seem surprising at first glance
given that at−1j and â
t−1
j have the same distribution π j(H
t−1,θ+j ) = π j(H
t−1,θ∗j), since
Ex,y∼ψ [x− y] = 0 for any distribution ψ. However, there is a subtle but important
difference: while at−1j and â
t−1









have arbitrarily different distributions. This is because these scores may depend on the
entire prefix vectors at−1j and â
t−1
j , respectively, which means that their distributions may
be different if at−1j 6= â
t−1
j . Fortunately, our algorithm does not require T to converge
because it learns the distribution of T during the interaction process, as we will discuss
in Section 8.3.3.
Interestingly, while T may not converge, it can be shown that the fluctuation of T
is eventually normally distributed, for any set of score functions z1, ...,zK with bound
[a,b]. Formally, let E[Tτ(aτj, â
τ
j)] and Var[Tτ(aτj, â
τ
j)] denote the finite expectation and
variance of Tτ(aτj, â
τ
j), where it is irrelevant if aτj, â
τ
j are sampled directly from δ
τ(θ∗j)
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will converge in distribution to the standard normal distribution as t→ ∞. Thus, T is
normally distributed as well.
To see this, first recall that the standard central limit theorem requires the random
variables Tτ to be independent and identically distributed. In our case, Tτ are independent
in that the random outcome of Tτ has no effect on the outcome of Tτ′ . However, Tτ and
Tτ′ depend on different action sequences, and may therefore have different distributions.
Hence, we have to show an additional property, commonly known as Lyapunov’s con-

















[∣∣Tτ(aτj, âτj)−E[Tτ(aτj, âτj)]∣∣2+d] . (8.10)
Since zk are bounded, we know that Tτ are bounded. Hence, the summands in (8.10)













The last part goes to zero if σt → ∞, and hence Lyapunov’s condition holds. If, on the
other hand, σt converges, then this means that the variance of Tτ is zero from some
point onward (or that it has an appropriate convergence to zero). From this point, θ∗j
prescribes fully deterministic action choices for agent j (i.e. ∃a j : π j(Hτ,a j,θ∗j) = 1),
and a statistical analysis is no longer necessary.
8.3.3 Learning the Test Distribution
Given that T is eventually normal, it may seem reasonable to compute (8.3) using a
normal distribution whose parameters are fitted during the interaction. However, this
fails to recognise that the distribution of T is shaped gradually over an extended time
period, and that the fluctuation around T can be heavily skewed in either direction until
convergence to a normal distribution emerges. Thus, a normal distribution may be a
poor fit during this shaping period.
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What is needed is a distribution which can represent any normal distribution, and
which is flexible enough to faithfully represent the gradual shaping. One distribution
which has these properties is the skew-normal distribution (Azzalini, 1985; O’Hagan
and Leonard, 1976). Given the PDF φ and CDF Φ of the standard normal distribution,
the skew-normal PDF is defined as















where ξ ∈ R is the location parameter, ω ∈ R+ is the scale parameter, and β ∈ R is the
shape parameter. Note that this reduces to the normal PDF for β = 0, in which case ξ
and ω correspond to the mean and standard deviation, respectively. Hence, the normal
distribution is a sub-class of the skew-normal distribution.
Our algorithm learns the shifting parameters of f during the interaction process,
using a simple but effective sampling procedure. Essentially, we use θ∗j to iteratively
generate N additional action vectors ãt,1j , ..., ã
t,N
j in the exact same way as â
t
j. The





j) | n = 1, ...,N
}
(8.13)

















whilst ensuring that ω is positive. An alternative is the method-of-moments estimator,
which can also be used to obtain initial values for (8.14). Note that it is usually unneces-
sary to estimate the parameters at every point in time; it seems reasonable to update the
parameters less frequently as the amount of evidence (i.e. observed actions) grows.
Given the asymmetry of the skew-normal distribution, the semantics of “as extreme
as” in (8.3) may no longer be obvious (e.g. is this with respect to the mean or mode?).
In addition, the usual tail-area calculation of the p-value requires the CDF, but there is
no closed form for the skew-normal CDF and approximating it is rather cumbersome.





f (µ | ξ,ω,β)
(8.15)
where µ is the mode of the fitted skew-normal distribution. This avoids the asymmetry
issue and is easier to compute.
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8.4 Experiments
We conducted a comprehensive set of experiments to investigate the accuracy (correct
and incorrect rejection), scalability (with number of actions), and sampling complexity














































where [b]1 = 1 if b is true and 0 otherwise. Intuitively, z1 measures the average ratio
of probability mass assigned to observed actions over most likely actions under θ∗j ; z2
measures the average expected (absolute) difference between probability mass assigned
to observed actions and sampled actions under θ∗j (subtracted from 1 to convert to
likelihood); and z3 measures the overlap between the empirical frequency distribution
of observed actions (cf. Section 8.1) and the averaged predicted distributions of θ∗j .
All score functions follow the likelihood design principle outlined in Section 8.3.1
(i.e. higher scores suggest higher likelihood of θ∗j being correct). Note that z1 and z3
are generally consistent (cf. Section 8.3.1), while z2 is consistent for |A j|= 2 but not
necessarily for |A j|> 2. Furthermore, z1,z2,z3 are all imperfect.
The parameters of the test distribution (cf. Section 8.3.3) were estimated less fre-
quently as t increased. The first estimation was performed at time t = 1 (i.e. after





time steps until the parameters were re-fitted. Throughout our experiments, we used a
significance level of α∗ = 0.01 (i.e. reject θ∗j if the p-value is below 0.01).
8.4.1 Random Behaviours
In the first set of experiments, the behaviour (type) spaces Θi and Θ j were restricted
to “random” behaviours. Each random behaviour is defined by a sequence of random
probability distributions over A j. The distributions are created by drawing uniform
random numbers from (0,1) for each action a j ∈ A j, and subsequent normalisation so
that the values sum up to 1.
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Figure 8.1: Average accuracy with random behaviours, for N = 50 and |A j|= 2,10,20.







each. The x-axis shows score functions zk used in test statistic.
Random behaviours are a good baseline for our experiments because they are usually
hard to distinguish. This is due to the fact that the entire set A j is always in the support
of the behaviours, and since they do not react to any past actions. These properties mean
that there is little structure in the interaction that can be used to distinguish behaviours.
We simulated 1000 interaction processes, each lasting 10000 time steps. In each
process, we randomly sampled behaviours θi ∈ Θi,θ+j ∈ Θ j to control agents i and
j, respectively. In half of these processes, we used a correct hypothesis θ∗j = θ
+
j . In
the other half, we sampled a random hypothesis θ∗j ∈ Θ j with θ∗j 6= θ
+
j . We repeated
each set of simulations for |A j| = 2,10,20 (with |Ai| = |A j|) and N = 10,50,100 (cf.
Section 8.3.3).
8.4.1.1 Accuracy & Scalability
Figure 8.1 shows the average accuracy of our algorithm (for N = 50), by which we mean
the average percentage of time steps in which the algorithm made correct decisions
(i.e. no reject if θ∗j = θ
+




j ). The x-axis shows the combination of score
functions used to compute the test statistic (e.g. [1 2] means that we combined z1,z2).
The results show that our algorithm achieved excellent accuracy, often bordering
the 100% mark. They also show that the algorithm scaled well with the number of
actions, with no degradation in accuracy. However, there were two exceptions to these
observations: Firstly, using z3 resulted in very poor accuracy for θ∗j 6= θ
+
j . Secondly, the
combination of z2,z3 scaled badly for θ∗j 6= θ
+
j .
The reason for both of these exceptions is that z3 is not a good scoring scheme for
random behaviours. The function z3 quantifies a similarity between the empirical fre-
quency distribution and the averaged hypothesised distributions. For random behaviours
(as defined in this work), both of these distributions will converge to the uniform distri-
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(a) |A j|= 2


















(b) |A j|= 10


















(c) |A j|= 20
Figure 8.2: Average p-values with random behaviours, for N = 50 and θ∗j 6= θ
+
j (i.e.
hypothesis wrong). Results averaged over 500 processes. The legend shows the score
functions zk used in test statistic.
bution. Thus, under z3, any two random behaviours will eventually be the same, which
explains the low accuracy for θ∗j 6= θ
+
j .
As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the inadequacy of z3 is solved when adding any of the
other score functions z1,z2. These functions add discriminative information to the test
statistic, which technically means that the cardinality |Πz| in (8.6) is reduced. However,
in the case of [z2,z3], the converge is substantially slower for higher |A j|, meaning that
more evidence is needed until θ∗j can be rejected. Figure 8.2 shows how a higher number
of actions affects the average convergence rate of p-values computed with z2,z3.
In addition to the score functions zk, a central aspect for the convergence of p-
values are the corresponding weights wk (cf. (8.7)). As mentioned in Section 8.3.1,
we use uniform weights wk = 1K . However, to show that the weighting is no trivial









j) denote the summands in (8.7). The weighting schemes
truemax / truemin assign wk = 1 for the first k that maximises / minimises |zτk|, and 0
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Figure 8.3: Average accuracy with random behaviours, for N = 50 and |A j|= 2,10,20.







each. The x-axis shows score functions zk used in test statistic. Weights wk computed
using truemax weighting.
































Figure 8.4: Average accuracy with random behaviours, for N = 50 and |A j|= 2,10,20.







each. The x-axis shows score functions zk used in test statistic. Weights wk computed
using truemin weighting.
otherwise. Similarly, the weighting schemes max / min assign wk = 1 for the first k that
maximises / minimises zτk, and 0 otherwise.
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the results for truemax and truemin. As can be seen in
the figures, truemax is very similar to uniform weights while truemin improves the
convergence for [z2,z3] but compromises elsewhere. The results for max and min are
very similar to those of truemin and truemax, respectively, hence we omit them.
Finally, we recomputed all accuracies using a more lenient significance level of
α∗ = 0.05. As could be expected, this marginally decreased and increased (i.e. by a






j , respectively. This was
primarily observed in the early stages of the interaction. Overall, however, the results
were very similar to those obtained with α∗ = 0.01.
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Figure 8.5: Average accuracy with random behaviours, for |A j|= 2 and N = 10,50,100.







each. The x-axis shows score functions zk used in test statistic.
































Figure 8.6: Average accuracy with random behaviours, for |A j|= 20 and N = 10,50,100.







each. The x-axis shows score functions zk used in test statistic.
8.4.1.2 Sampling Complexity
Recall that N specifies the number of sampled action vectors ãt,nj used to learn the
distribution of the test statistic (cf. Section 8.3.3). In the previous section, we reported
results for N = 50. In this section, we investigate differences in accuracy for N =
10,50,100.
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show the differences for |A j|= 2,20, respectively. (The figure
for |A j|= 10 was virtually the same as the one for |A j|= 20, except with minor improve-
ments in accuracy for the [z2,z3] cluster. Hence, we omit it here.) As can be seen, there
were improvements of up to 10% from N = 10 to N = 50, and no (or very marginal) im-
provements from N = 50 to N = 100. This was observed for all |A j|= 2,10,20, and all
constellations of score functions. The fact that N = 50 was sufficient even for |A j|= 20
is remarkable, since, under random behaviours, there are 20t possible action vectors to
sample at any time t.
We also compared the learned skew-normal distributions and found that they fit-
ted the data very well. Figures 8.7 and 8.8 show the histograms and fitted skew-normal
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(a) N = 10



















(b) N = 50















(c) N = 100
Figure 8.7: Example histograms and fitted skew-normal distributions (shown in red curve)
after 1000 time steps, for random behaviours with |A j|= 10 and N = 10,50,100. Using
score function z1 in test statistic.
distributions for two example processes after 1000 time steps. In Figure 8.8, we delib-
erately chose an example in which the learned distribution was maximally skewed for
N = 10, which is a sign that N was too small. Nonetheless, in the majority of the pro-
cesses, the learned distribution was only moderately skewed and our algorithm achieved
an average accuracy of 90% even for N = 10. Moreover, if one wants to avoid maxi-
mally skewed distributions, one can simply restrict the parameter space when fitting the
skew-normal (specifically, the shape parameter β; cf. Section 8.3.3).
The flexibility of the skew-normal distribution was particularly useful in the early
stages of the interaction, in which the test statistic typically does not follow a normal
distribution. Figure 8.9 shows the test distribution for an example process after 10
time steps, using z2 for the test statistic and N = 100 (the histogram was created
using N = 10000). The learned skew-normal approximated the true test distribution
very closely. Note that, in such examples, the normal and Student distributions do not
produce good fits.
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(a) N = 10


















(b) N = 50
























(c) N = 100
Figure 8.8: Example histograms and fitted skew-normal distributions (shown in red curve)
after 1000 time steps, for random behaviours with |A j|= 10 and N = 10,50,100. Using
score functions z1,z2,z3 in test statistic.
Our implementation of the algorithm performed all calculations as iterative updates
(except for the skew-normal fitting). Hence, it used little (fixed) memory and had very
low computation times. For example, using all three score functions and |A j|= 20,N =
100, one cycle in the algorithm (cf. Algorithm 5) took on average less than 1 millisecond
without fitting the skew-normal parameters, and less than 10 milliseconds when fitting
the skew-normal parameters (using an off-the-shelf Simplex-optimiser with default
parameters). The times were measured using Matlab R2014a on a Unix machine with a
2.6 GHz Intel Core i5 processor.
8.4.2 Adaptive Behaviours
We complemented the “structure-free” interaction of random behaviours by conducting
analogous experiments with three additional classes of behaviours. Specifically, we used
the benchmark framework specified in Chapter 6, which consists of 78 distinct 2×2
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Figure 8.9: Example of true test distribution for z2 and learned skew-normal distribution
(shown in red curve) after 10 time steps, with |A j|= 10 and N = 100.
matrix games and three methods to automatically generate sets of behaviours for any
given game. The three behaviour classes are Leader-Follower-Trigger Agents (LFT),
Co-Evolved Decision Trees (CDT), and Co-Evolved Neural Networks (CNN). These
classes cover a broad spectrum of possible behaviours, including fully deterministic
(CDT), fully stochastic (CNN), and hybrid (LFT) behaviours. Furthermore, all generated
behaviours are adaptive to varying degrees (i.e. they adapt their action choices based on
the other player’s choices). Detailed descriptions of the games and behaviour classes
can be found in Appendices A and B, respectively.
The following experiments were performed for each behaviour class, using identical
randomisation: For each of the 78 games, we simulated 10 interaction processes, each
lasting 10000 time steps. For each process, we randomly sampled behaviours θi ∈
Θi,θ
+
j ∈Θ j to control agents i and j, respectively, where Θi, Θ j were restricted to the
same behaviour class. In half of these processes, we used a correct hypothesis θ∗j = θ
+
j ,
and in the other half, we sampled a random hypothesis θ∗j ∈Θ j with θ∗j 6= θ
+
j . As before,
we repeated each simulation for N = 10,50,100 and all constellations of score functions,
but found that there were virtually no differences. Hence, in the following, we report
results for N = 50 and the [z1,z2,z3] cluster.
Figure 8.10a shows the average accuracy achieved by our algorithm for all three
behaviour classes. While the accuracy for θ∗j = θ
+
j was generally good, the accuracy
for θ∗j 6= θ
+
j was mixed. Note that this was not merely due to the fact that the score
functions were imperfect (cf. Section 8.3.1), since we obtained the same results for all
combinations. Rather, this reveals an inherent limitation of our approach, which is that
we do not actively probe aspects of the hypothesis θ∗j . In other words, our algorithm
performs statistical hypothesis tests based only on evidence that was generated by θi.





































(b) Θi set to random behaviours















Figure 8.10: Average accuracy with behaviour classes LFT, CDT, CNN, for N = 50.







each. Bars shown for [z1,z2,z3] test statistic.
class. Each node in a tree θ+j corresponds to a past action taken by θi (cf. Figure B.1 in
Appendix B). Depending on how θi chooses actions, we may only ever see a subset of
the entire tree that defines θ+j . However, if our hypothesis θ
∗
j differs from θ
+
j only in
the unseen aspects of θ+j , then there is no way for our algorithm to differentiate the two.






j . Note that this problem did
not occur in random behaviours because, there, all aspects are eventually visible.
Following this observation, we repeated the same experiments but restricted Θi to
random behaviours (cf. Section 8.4.1), with the goal of exploring θ∗j more thoroughly. As
shown in Figure 8.10b, this led to significant improvements in accuracy, especially for
the CDT class. Nonetheless, choosing actions purely randomly may not be a sufficient
probing strategy, hence the accuracy for CNN was still relatively low. For CNN, this
was further complicated by the fact that two neural networks θ j,θ′j may formally be
different (θ j 6= θ′j) but have essentially the same action probabilities (with extremely





This thesis is a comprehensive study of the type-based methodology in the context of ad
hoc coordination, in which an autonomous agent seeks to achieve flexible and efficient
interaction with other agents whose behaviours are a priori unknown. The idea in the
type-based method is to compare the observed actions of the other agents with a set
of hypothesised behaviours, called types, and to plan our own actions with respect to
those types which we believe are most likely. We formulated a canonical description of
this idea, called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA), and demonstrated its
potential to address ad hoc coordination problems in empirical case studies.
Two central aspects of this method are the beliefs over types and the types themselves.
In this regard, we identified and addressed a spectrum of important questions, pertaining
to the evolution and impact of beliefs as well as the implications and detection of
incorrect types. Specifically, how can evidence be incorporated into beliefs and under
what conditions will the beliefs be correct? What practical impact do prior beliefs have
and can they be computed automatically? Moreover, what relation must the hypothesised
types have to the true types in order for HBA to solve its task? And is it possible to
ascertain during the interaction whether the hypothesised types are incorrect?
Ad hoc coordination in multiagent systems constitutes an extremely complex and
difficult problem, with relevance to many important applications. The type-based method
has the potential to be a key component in solutions to ad hoc coordination problems,
and this thesis provides both a formal introduction as well as useful insights regarding
the application and theoretical underpinning of this method. In the remaining sections,
we will highlight the key results of this thesis, discuss some of the limitations of HBA,
and present possible directions for future research.
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9.1 Selection of Key Results
This thesis provides a number of contributions to the theory and practice of the type-
based method. A summary of the contributions can be found in Section 1.1 as well as at
beginning of corresponding chapters. Some of the results stand out from the others, and
the following is a selection of key results in this thesis:
• A remarkable result is the fact that we were able to show that prior beliefs over
hypothesised types can be computed automatically with consistent effects on the
long-term performance of HBA (cf. Observation 3 in Chapter 6). This is intriguing
because it demonstrates that prior beliefs have the potential to manipulate the
interaction trajectory to optimise certain metrics (such as our own payoffs), while
in truth and without further evidence, there is no reason to believe that any
one type is a priori more likely than others (see Section 6.2 for explanations).
Practically, this result indicates that prior beliefs could be eliminated as a manual
parameter in the type-based method and instead be computed automatically from
the hypothesised types and problem description. However, the relevance of this
result goes beyond the type-based method studied in this thesis; it also relates to
the theory of learning in Bayesian games (cf. Section 2.4) and to a substantial
body of research on prior beliefs (e.g. Bernardo, 1979; Jaynes, 1968).
• A potential concern associated with the type-based method is the fact that the
hypothesised types may be incorrect. Hence, an important question is what relation
the hypothesised types must have to the true types in order for HBA to be able to
solve its task optimally? In this regard, we were able to draw a connection to the
theory of formal model verification (cf. Section 2.7). Specifically, in Chapter 7, we
proved the notable result that if there exists a probabilistic bisimulation between
the interaction processes induced by the true and hypothesised types, then HBA
will solve its task with the same probability and in the same average time as if it
knew the true types, regardless of the specific nature and magnitude of inaccuracies
in the hypothesised types. Practically, this means that we can use efficient methods
from the model checking literature (e.g. Baier, 1996; Larsen and Skou, 1991) to
verify optimality of types in practice.
• The bisimulation analysis for optimal types is performed before any interaction
and with respect to the true types of other agents. How can we ascertain during
the interaction, and with no prior knowledge of the true types, whether our hy-
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pothesised types may be incorrect? Interestingly, it can be shown that established
methods for statistical hypothesis testing can be employed to answer this question.
Specifically, in Chapter 8, we formulated a highly-efficient automated analysis in
the form of a frequentist hypothesis test (i.e. p-values) and showed that the test
distribution can be learned during the interaction process. Since our method can
be applied to the combination of beliefs and types as well as to individual types
(cf. Section 8.2), it is of relevance for any intelligent agent that uses a hypothesis
regarding the behaviour of other agents, including opponent modelling methods
such as those discussed in Section 2.3.
9.2 Discussion
As discussed in Chapter 1 and Section 2.3, the type-based method (and, specifically, its
canonical description HBA) has several features which make it a suitable approach to
ad hoc coordination problems. In particular, the fact that we may hypothesise any types
of behaviours means that we can potentially deal with a great variety of different agents.
Furthermore, since types specify complete behaviours, we can plan actions far into the
future, including in previously unseen situations. Nonetheless, there are some potential
limitations that should be taken into account.
One potential limitation is the computational complexity of the planning step in
HBA. In its canonical form (Algorithm 2), HBA unfolds a complete tree of all future
trajectories which in practice have to be pruned after some time or depth (e.g. as in
Algorithm 3). The time complexity of this process is exponential in factors such as the
number of agents, actions, and states in the system. Therefore, the planning step can
be a very costly operation in complex interactive domains. Nonetheless, as shown in
Section 4.2, the planning step can be made more efficient by using stochastic sampling,
albeit possibly at the cost of reduced planning accuracy.
Another potential limitation is the fact that the number of types one may wish to
hypothesise can grow substantially with the size of the interaction problem (e.g. number
of agents, actions, states, etc.). For example, it is relatively simple to hypothesise a
small set of reasonable types with good coverage of possible behaviours for simple
matrix games such as those used in Section 4.1. However, it is less trivial to hypothesise
a set of reasonable types with good coverage in more complex domains such as the
foraging domain used in Section 4.2. From a computational perspective, it is advisable
to minimise the number of hypothesised types since each of their predictions have to
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be computed at each point in time. Moreover, if types are specified manually, this can
become a very cumbersome task in complex domains.
Since we define types as black-box functions, they may implement any kind of logic
and, therefore, be arbitrarily complex. In most of our experiments, we used relatively
simple types which can be executed very efficiently (e.g. see Tables 4.2 and 4.3 as well as
Appendix B). However, in the simulated experiments discussed in Section 4.2, we also
used complex types which use reinforcement learning and plan their actions with respect
to the system dynamics and learned agent models (specifically, C/JAL implemented
using Algorithm 4). This significantly increased the computational demands of HBA
compared to the simpler types used in the other experiments.
Section 1.2 discussed the informational assumptions underlying HBA. One such
assumption is that states and actions can be observed directly. This assumption may
be problematic in robotic domains, in which states and actions are often not directly
observed but instead inferred from possibly noisy and incomplete sensor data. If the
degree of stochasticity (i.e. noisiness) is too large to handle with heuristic solutions
(e.g. maximum probability heuristic), then it may be necessary to explicitly model such
uncertainties, e.g. as in I-POMDPs (cf. Section 2.5).
Another assumption is that the system dynamics (i.e. the rules by which the system
transitions into different states) are known beforehand and correct. In many applica-
tions, it may be difficult or impossible to specify a complete and correct model of the
system. Rather, the model may be incomplete and inaccurate, or the model may have
to be learned during the interaction using machine learning methods. This bears an
interesting resemblance to the possibility of incorrect hypothesised types, which we
treated extensively in this thesis. It would be interesting to explore to what extent our
observations regarding incorrect types also hold for incorrect system models.
9.3 Directions for Future Work
This thesis provides a rich ground for future research, and below we discuss a selection
of possible research directions. (Additional inspiration may be taken from the discussion
on scope and limitations in Section 1.2, and the discussion in Section 9.2.)
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Posterior and Prior Beliefs
In Chapter 5, we formulated three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior
beliefs. Each of these formulations is based on assumptions regarding properties of
the type distribution, and limited by the conditions under which they are guaranteed to
converge to the true distribution of types. One direction for future research would be to
investigate novel formulations of posterior beliefs which are more flexible regarding
properties of the type distribution, and which converge to the true type distribution under
less restrictive conditions. Furthermore, since our correctness analysis was asymptotic,
it would be interesting to know if there exist useful finite-time error bounds.
In Chapter 6, we specified a number of methods to automatically compute prior
beliefs and showed empirically that they can produce consistent performance effects. An
interesting direction for future research would be to develop a theoretical explanation of
these results. Moreover, it would be interesting to know if prior beliefs can be computed
efficiently with useful performance guarantees. The LP-priors studied in this work are
a first attempt in this direction, since solving a LP-prior also provides a bound on the
expected loss of whichever intrinsic metric is being optimised. However, as discussed
in Chapter 6, the LP formulation is a simplification of the true reasoning of HBA and so
the bound may be incorrect.
Optimality of Hypothesised Types
In Chapter 7, we analysed under what relation between hypothesised and true types HBA
is able to solve its task, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Our analysis was
general in that it was invariant to the specific posterior formulation used in HBA. This
analysis could be refined by committing to a specific posterior formulation (such as
“product posteriors”; cf. Section 5.2). Furthermore, our analysis focused on flexibility,
which is the average probability with which HBA is expected to solve its task. However,
it does not directly relate to the notion of efficiency, which is the average payoff received
in solved tasks (cf. Section 3.3). An interesting direction for future work would be to
extend our analysis to account for both flexibility and efficiency.
Properties of Behavioural Hypothesis Testing
The statistical hypothesis test developed in Chapter 8 is based on the notion of score
functions, which specify a relation between observed actions and hypothesised action
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probabilities. To bring some structure into the space of score functions, we introduced
the concepts of consistency and perfection as minimal and ideal properties, respectively.
However, more research is required to understand precisely what properties a useful
score function should satisfy, and whether the concept of perfection is feasible or even
necessary in the general case.
The overall test statistic is computed as a linear combination of the differences be-
tween scores, where each coefficient in the sum can be interpreted as a weight that
quantifies the importance of differences. While our asymptotic analysis of the test statis-
tic was agnostic of the specific weighting, we experimented with alternative weighting
schemes to show that the weighting can have a substantial effect on convergence rates.
An interesting direction for future research would be to investigate the effect of score
weights on the convergence of p-values and overall decision accuracy.
Automatic Hypothesis Generation
There are several methods to hypothesise possible behaviours. The default method is
to specify types manually based on past experience and expectations regarding the
behaviour of agents. We chose this approach in the case studies presented in Chapter 4.
Another method is to generate types automatically from the problem description. For
example, in Chapters 6 and 8, we used three different methods to automatically generate
sets of behaviours for any given matrix game. Yet another method would be to extract
possible behaviours from a corpus of historical data, for example by using machine
learning methods. An important direction for future work is to develop new methods
which can automatically hypothesise reasonable sets of behaviours for complex domains,
using information from the problem description and past experience.
Structured Types
As discussed in Section 9.2, a potential problem with the type-based method is the
fact that the number of types one may want to hypothesise can grow dramatically
with the size of the interaction problem. This is problematic from a computational
perspective because the prediction of each type has to be computed at each point in
time. Furthermore, if types are specified manually, this can be a cumbersome task for
the user. Therefore, it seems a rather important research direction to develop methods to
effectively reduce the number of hypothesised types.
One way to achieve this would be to allow for parameters in the type specifications.
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That is, rather than hypothesising several instances of essentially the same behaviour
with different parameter settings, it would be useful to specify a single parameterised
type to cover the entire spectrum of instances. This would require an ability to automati-
cally infer the correct parameter setting from the interaction history. Another possible
method would be to allow for a hierarchical description of types. That is, instead of
specifying a single complete behaviour, we might specify a library of incomplete be-
haviours (for example, limited to subsets of the state space) and learn how to combine
them to describe the true behaviour of an agent.
Complex Applications
Much research in artificial intelligence is focused on innovative applications such as
adaptive user interfaces, robotic elderly care, and automated trading agents. Ad hoc
coordination is a key technological challenge in such applications (cf. Chapter 1),
and the type-based method has the potential to be an important component in their
realisation. The experiments conducted in this thesis show how a method such as HBA
can be applied successfully in practice, albeit in simplified domains and under laboratory
conditions. Therefore, the next step is to deploy HBA in complex real-world applications
such as the ones mentioned above. We expect that such a transition would bring many




This appendix contains a listing of all structurally distinct strictly ordinal 2×2 matrix
games, based on (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966). The games are distinct in that no game
can be reproduced by any transformation of any other game. Possible transformations
include interchanging the rows, columns, players, and any combinations thereof. The
games are strictly ordinal, meaning that each player ranks the 4 possible outcomes from
1 (least preferred) to 4 (most preferred), and no two outcomes can have the same rank.




N is the number of the game and X is the corresponding number of the game in
the original listing (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966). The variables ai, j and bi, j, where
i, j ∈ {1,2}, contain the payoffs to player 1 (row player) and player 2 (column player),
respectively, if player 1 chooses action i and player 2 chooses action j. A payoff pair is
underlined if the corresponding actions constitute a pure Nash equilibrium.
The listing is divided into one listing for all no-conflict games and one listing for all
conflict games. In a no-conflict game, the players have the same set of most preferred
outcomes. In a conflict game, the players disagree on the most preferred outcomes.
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A.1 No-Conflict Games
1 (1)
4, 4 3, 3
2, 2 1, 1
2 (2)
4, 4 3, 3
1, 2 2, 1
3 (3)
4, 4 3, 2
2, 3 1, 1
4 (4)
4, 4 3, 2
1, 3 2, 1
5 (5)
4, 4 3, 1
1, 3 2, 2
6 (6)
4, 4 2, 3
3, 2 1, 1
7 (22)
4, 4 3, 3
2, 1 1, 2
8 (23)1
4, 4 3, 3
1, 1 2, 2
9 (24)
4, 4 3, 2
2, 1 1, 3
10 (25)
4, 4 3, 2
1, 1 2, 3
11 (26)
4, 4 2, 3
3, 1 1, 2
12 (27)
4, 4 2, 2
3, 1 1, 3
13 (28)
4, 4 3, 1
2, 2 1, 3
14 (29)
4, 4 3, 1
1, 2 2, 3
15 (30)
4, 4 2, 1
3, 2 1, 3
16 (58)
4, 4 2, 3
1, 1 3, 2
17 (59)
4, 4 2, 2
1, 1 3, 3
18 (60)
4, 4 2, 1
1, 2 3, 3
19 (61)
4, 4 1, 3
3, 1 2, 2
20 (62)
4, 4 1, 2
3, 1 2, 3
21 (63)
4, 4 1, 2
2, 1 3, 3
A.2 Conflict Games
1 (7)
3, 3 4, 2
2, 4 1, 1
2 (8)
3, 3 4, 2
1, 4 2, 1
3 (9)
3, 3 4, 1
1, 4 2, 2
4 (10)
2, 3 4, 2
1, 4 3, 1
5 (11)
2, 3 4, 1
1, 4 3, 2
6 (12)
2, 2 4, 1
1, 4 3, 3
7 (13)
3, 4 4, 2
2, 3 1, 1
8 (14)
3, 4 4, 2
1, 3 2, 1
9 (15)
3, 4 4, 1
2, 3 1, 2
10 (16)
3, 4 4, 1
1, 3 2, 2
11 (17)
2, 4 4, 2
1, 3 3, 1
12 (18)
2, 4 4, 1
1, 3 3, 2
13 (19)
3, 4 4, 3
1, 2 2, 1
14 (20)
3, 4 4, 3
2, 2 1, 1
15 (21)
2, 4 4, 3
1, 2 3, 1
1Game no. 23 in the original listing (Rapoport and Guyer, 1966) has a typo: payoff a2,1 must be 1.
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16 (31)
3, 4 2, 2
1, 3 4, 1
17 (32)
3, 4 2, 1
1, 3 4, 2
18 (33)
3, 4 1, 2
2, 3 4, 1
19 (34)
3, 4 1, 1
2, 3 4, 2
20 (35)
2, 4 3, 2
1, 3 4, 1
21 (36)
2, 4 3, 1
1, 3 4, 2
22 (37)
3, 4 2, 3
1, 2 4, 1
23 (38)
3, 4 1, 3
2, 2 4, 1
24 (39)
2, 4 3, 3
1, 2 4, 1
25 (40)
3, 4 4, 1
2, 2 1, 3
26 (41)
3, 4 4, 1
1, 2 2, 3
27 (42)
3, 3 4, 1
2, 2 1, 4
28 (43)
3, 3 4, 1
1, 2 2, 4
29 (44)
2, 4 4, 1
1, 2 3, 3
30 (45)
3, 2 4, 1
2, 3 1, 4
31 (46)
3, 2 4, 1
1, 3 2, 4
32 (47)
2, 3 4, 1
1, 2 3, 4
33 (48)
2, 2 4, 1
1, 3 3, 4
34 (49)
3, 4 4, 3
2, 1 1, 2
35 (50)
3, 4 4, 3
1, 1 2, 2
36 (51)
3, 4 4, 2
2, 1 1, 3
37 (52)
3, 4 4, 2
1, 1 2, 3
38 (53)
3, 3 4, 2
2, 1 1, 4
39 (54)
3, 3 4, 2
1, 1 2, 4
40 (55)
2, 4 4, 3
1, 1 3, 2
41 (56)
2, 4 4, 2
1, 1 3, 3
42 (57)
2, 3 4, 2
1, 1 3, 4
43 (64)
3, 4 2, 1
1, 2 4, 3
44 (65)
2, 4 3, 1
1, 2 4, 3
45 (66)
3, 3 2, 4
4, 2 1, 1
46 (67)
2, 3 3, 4
4, 2 1, 1
47 (68)
2, 2 3, 4
4, 3 1, 1
48 (69)
2, 2 4, 3
3, 4 1, 1
49 (70)
3, 4 2, 1
4, 2 1, 3
50 (71)
3, 3 2, 1
4, 2 1, 4
51 (72)
3, 2 2, 1
4, 3 1, 4
52 (73)
2, 4 4, 1
3, 2 1, 3
53 (74)
2, 4 3, 1
4, 2 1, 3
54 (75)
2, 3 4, 1
3, 2 1, 4
55 (76)
2, 3 3, 1
4, 2 1, 4
56 (77)
2, 2 4, 1
3, 3 1, 4
57 (78)
2, 2 3, 1




This appendix contains algorithmic descriptions and parameter settings for the type
generation methods used in Chapters 6 and 8. Informal descriptions of these methods
can be found in Section 6.1.4.
We assume 2×2 matrix games in which Uk(ai,a j), k = i, j, denotes the payoff to
player k if player i takes action ai and player j takes action a j. Furthermore, we use πk to
denote a stage-game strategy for player k, which is defined as a probability distribution
πk ∈ ∆(Ak) over player k’s actions. We write Uk(πi,π j) to denote the expected payoff to
player k under strategies (πi,π j). Finally, we use i to denote the player controlled by
the agents described in this appendix, and j or −i to denote the other player.
B.1 Leader-Follower-Trigger Agents
Given a matrix game with payoffs Ui, j, we use Algorithm 6 to generate the set Ω̂ of all
“target solutions” of maximum length l. Each target solution ω∈ Ω̂ consists of 1 to l con-
secutive actions pairs (âti, â
t
j) to be played by the players. The set contains only those
solutions in which each player has an average payoff at least as has high as the max-
imin (safety) value for that player. (Target solutions of length 2 or greater in which all
action pairs are identical are removed.) We note that Crandall (2014) also specifies that
target solutions must be “enforceable”, such that following the solution constitutes a
best-response for each player (see Section 3.1 in Crandall, 2014). However, as this may
significantly reduce the number of target solutions, we omitted this additional require-
ment in our work. Finally, for each target solution ω in the set Ω̂, we use Algorithms 7,
8, and 9 to create a leader, follower, and trigger agent, respectively.
Parameter setting: maximum solution length l = 2
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Algorithm 6 Procedure to generate target solutions for given game
Input: matrix game Ui, j
Output: target solutions Ω̂
Parameters: maximum solution length l
// Generate all solution sequences
Ω←
{
ω = 〈(â1i , â1j), ...,(âti, âtj)〉 | 1≤ t ≤ l, âi ∈ Ai, â j ∈ A j
}
// Remove solutions in which either player does not obtain its maximin value
Ω̂←
{

















Algorithm 7 Leader agent
Parameters: target solution ω
Initialise: “guilt” γ← 0
loop
Observe current time t
(âti, â
t
j)← next action pair in ω
if γ = 0 then
Play action âti
else
Play minimax strategy πi ∈ argminπi∈∆(Ai)maxπ j∈∆(A j)U j(πi,π j)
end if
Observe action atj taken by player j





j)− ω̄( j)+ [γ = 0]1 ∗0.1
]
where ω̄(k) defined in Algorithm 6
end if
end loop
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Algorithm 8 Follower agent
Parameters: target solution ω
Initialise: d← false
loop








j)← next action pair in ω
end if
Play action âti
Observe action atj taken by player j






Algorithm 9 Trigger agent
Parameters: target solution ω
Initialise: d← false
loop
Observe current time t
if d then




j)← next action pair in ω
Play action âti
end if
Observe action atj taken by player j
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B.2 Co-Evolved Decision Trees / Neural Networks
Given a matrix game with payoffs Ui, j, we used the generic co-evolution algorithm
given in Algorithm 10 to generate sets of decision tree agents and neural network agents
for both players. The precise structure of these agents is explained in Figures B.1 and
B.2, respectively. The parameter listing, below, specifies further implementation details
for the co-evolution algorithm.
Parameter setting:
• Agents per population: 50
• Each agent evaluated against random 40% of other population
• Fitness = average payoff after 20 rounds (∈ [1,4]) – average similarity (∈ [0,1])
• Resampling method: linear ranking
• Decision trees:
– Tree depth: 3 (up to three previous actions of other player)
– Evolutions: 300 (population with highest average fitness returned)
– Similarity of two trees: percentage of nodes with same action choice
– Random mutation of single node (flipping action): 5% of population
– Random crossing of sub-trees (preserving tree depth): 30% of population
• Neural networks:
– Input layer: 4 nodes (up to two previous joint actions)
– Hidden layer: 5 nodes
– Output layer: 1 node (probability of action 1)
– Each node fully-connected with nodes of next layer
– Standard sigmoidal threshold function
– Evolutions: 1000 (population with highest average fitness returned)
– Similarity of two networks: 1 – average difference of output for each input
– Random mutation of single input weight (standard normal shift): 20% of population
– Random crossing of nodes (preserving network structure): 10% of population





































Figure B.1: Instance of a decision tree agent (controlling player i). Each node contains
the action taken by player i in response to the previous actions of player j, represented
by the edges. All trees in this work have depth 3, which means that they account for up
to 3 previous actions of player j. For example, if the previous actions of player j were
〈2,1,1〉, then player i chooses action 1; if only two rounds have been played and player
















Figure B.2: Structure of neural network agent. The agent controls player i, the other
player is denoted by j. Each network consists of 4 input nodes, 5 hidden nodes, and
1 output node. The input nodes take the previous two joint actions as inputs, or -1 if
not available. Each node is fully-connected to the nodes in the next layer. Nodes have
individual weights wk for each incoming edge xk, plus one “threshold” weight w∗. Using
the standard sigmoid function, a node’s output value is computed as 1
1+e−(wT x−w∗)
. The
output node “out” returns the probability of taking action 1.
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Algorithm 10 Generic co-evolution algorithm
Input: matrix game Ui, j
Output: sets Φ∗i and Φ∗j of co-evolved agents
Parameters: see text
Initialise random populations Φi and Φ j
Set Φ∗i ←Φi and Φ∗j ←Φ j
Evaluate initial populations:
Each agent φi ∈Φi plays Ui, j against random sample of Φ j, and vice versa
repeat
Rank agents based on their fitness and resample proportionately
Modify agents:
Random mutation of random sample in Φi and Φ j, respectively
Random crossing of random sample in Φi and Φ j, respectively
Evaluate current populations:
Each agent φi ∈Φi plays Ui, j against random sample of Φ j, and vice versa
if average fitness of (Φi,Φ j) better than (Φ∗i ,Φ∗j) then
Set Φ∗i ←Φi and Φ∗j ←Φ j
end if
until maximum number of evolutions reached
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Journal of Statistics, Series A, pages 21–31, 1977.
M.J. Bayarri and J.O. Berger. P values for composite null models. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 95(452):1127–1142, 2000.
R.E. Bellman. Dynamic Programming. Princeton University Press, 1957.
J.O. Berger and T. Sellke. Testing a point null hypothesis: the irreconcilability of p
values and evidence (with discussion). Journal of the American Statistical Association,
82:112–122, 1987.
J.M. Bernardo. Reference posterior distributions for Bayesian inference. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological), 41(2):113–147, 1979.
E. Bonchek-Dokow, G.A. Kaminka, and C. Domshlak. Distinguishing between inten-
tional and unintentional sequences of actions. In Proceedings of the 9th International
Conference on Cognitive Modeling, pages 170–175, 2009.
M. Bowling and P. McCracken. Coordination and adaptation in impromptu teams. In
Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 53–58,
2005.
M. Bowling and M. Veloso. Multiagent learning using a variable learning rate. Artificial
Intelligence, 136(2):215–250, 2002.
G.E.P. Box. Sampling and Bayes’ inference in scientific modelling and robustness.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A (General), pages 383–430, 1980.
R.I. Brafman and M. Tennenholtz. R-max – A general polynomial time algorithm
for near-optimal reinforcement learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 3:
213–231, 2003.
S.J. Brams. Theory of Moves. Cambridge University Press, 1993.
G.W. Brown. Iterative solution of games by fictitious play. Activity Analysis of
Production and Allocation, 13(1):374–376, 1951.
S. Carberry. Techniques for plan recognition. User Modeling and User-Adapted
Interaction, 11(1-2):31–48, 2001.
116 Bibliography
D. Carmel and S. Markovitch. Learning models of opponent’s strategy in game playing.
In Proceedings of the AAAI Fall Symposium on Games: Planning and Learning,
pages 140–147, 1993.
D. Chakraborty and P. Stone. Cooperating with a Markovian ad hoc teammate. In Pro-
ceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, pages 1085–1092, 2013.
G. Chalkiadakis and C. Boutilier. Coordination in multiagent reinforcement learn-
ing: a bayesian approach. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 709–716, 2003.
E. Charniak and R.P. Goldman. A Bayesian model of plan recognition. Artificial
Intelligence, 64(1):53–79, 1993.
E.M. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D.A. Peled. Model Checking. The MIT Press, 1999.
C. Claus and C. Boutilier. The dynamics of reinforcement learning in cooperative
multiagent systems. In Proceedings of the 15th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 746–752, 1998.
V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm
that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents.
Machine Learning, 67(1-2):23–43, 2007.
D.R. Cox. The role of significance tests (with discussion). Scandinavian Journal of
Statistics, 4:49–70, 1977.
J.W. Crandall. Towards minimizing disappointment in repeated games. Journal of
Artificial Intelligence Research, 49:111–142, 2014.
E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D.K. Levine. Learning to play Bayesian games. Games
and Economic Behavior, 46(2):282–303, 2004.
M.B. Dias, T.K. Harris, B. Browning, E.G. Jones, B. Argall, M. Veloso, A. Stentz, and
A. Rudnicky. Dynamically formed human-robot teams performing coordinated tasks.
In AAAI Spring Symposium “To Boldly Go Where No Human-Robot Team Has Gone
Before”, pages 30–38, 2006.
Bibliography 117
P. Doshi and P.J. Gmytrasiewicz. On the difficulty of achieving equilibrium in interactive
POMDPs. In Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
pages 1131–1136, 2006.
P. Doshi and P.J. Gmytrasiewicz. Monte carlo sampling methods for approximating
interactive POMDPs. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, pages 297–337,
2009.
P. Doshi and D. Perez. Generalized point based value iteration for interactive POMDPs.
In Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial intelligence, pages 63–68,
2008.
P. Doshi, Y. Zeng, and Q. Chen. Graphical models for interactive POMDPs: representa-
tions and solutions. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 18(3):376–416,
2009.
P. Doshi, X. Qu, A. Goodie, and D. Young. Modeling recursive reasoning by humans
using empirically informed interactive POMDPs. In Proceedings of the 9th Interna-
tional Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 1223–1230,
2010.
H. Fischer. A History of the Central Limit Theorem: From Classical to Modern Proba-
bility Theory. Springer Science & Business Media, 2010.
R.A. Fisher. The Design of Experiments. Oliver & Boyd, 1935.
D.P. Foster and H.P. Young. Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. Games
and Economic Behavior, 45(1):73–96, 2003.
D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Theory, 53(2):236–260, 1991a.
D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole. Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1991b.
Y. Gal, A. Pfeffer, F. Marzo, and B.J. Grosz. Learning social preferences in games.
In Proceedings of the 19th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
226–231, 2004.
A. Gelman and C.R. Shalizi. Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics. British
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 66(1):8–38, 2013.
118 Bibliography
K. Genter and P. Stone. Influencing a flock via ad hoc teamwork. In Proceedings of the
9th International Conference on Swarm Intelligence, pages 110–121, 2014.
K. Genter, N. Agmon, and P. Stone. Role-based ad hoc teamwork. In Plan, Activity,
and Intent Recognition: Theory and Practice, pages 251–272. Elsevier, 2013.
I. Gilboa and D. Schmeidler. A Theory of Case-Based Decisions. Cambridge University
Press, 2001.
P.J. Gmytrasiewicz and P. Doshi. A framework for sequential planning in multiagent
settings. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 24(1):49–79, 2005.
P.J. Gmytrasiewicz and E.H. Durfee. Rational coordination in multi-agent environments.
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, 3(4):319–350, 2000.
B.J. Grosz and S. Kraus. Collaborative plans for complex group action. Artificial
Intelligence, 86(2):269–357, 1996.
B.J. Grosz and S. Kraus. The evolution of SharedPlans. In Foundations of Rational
Agency, pages 227–262. Springer, 1999.
H. Hansson and B. Jonsson. A logic for reasoning about time and reliability. Formal
Aspects of Computing, 6(5):512–535, 1994.
J.C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. Part
I. The basic model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182, 1967.
J.C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. Part
II. Bayesian equilibrium points. Management Science, 14(5):320–334, 1968a.
J.C. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players. Part
III. The basic probability distribution of the game. Management Science, 14(7):
486–502, 1968b.
S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell. A reinforcement procedure leading to correlated equilibrium.
Economic Essays: A Festschrift for Werner Hildenbrand, pages 181–200, 2001.
K. Hindriks and D. Tykhonov. Opponent modelling in automated multi-issue negotiation
using Bayesian learning. In Proceedings of the 7th International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 331–338, 2008.
Bibliography 119
J.H. Holland. Adaptation in natural and artificial systems: An introductory analysis
with applications to biology, control, and artificial intelligence. The MIT Press, 1975.
J. Hu and M.P. Wellman. Nash q-learning for general-sum stochastic games. The
Journal of Machine Learning Research, 4:1039–1069, 2003. ISSN 1532-4435.
E.T. Jaynes. Prior probabilities. IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics,
4(3):227–241, 1968.
J.S. Jordan. Bayesian learning in normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior,
3(1):60–81, 1991.
L.P. Kaelbling, M.L. Littman, and A.R. Cassandra. Planning and acting in partially
observable stochastic domains. Artificial intelligence, 101:99–134, 1998.
D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.
Econometrica, 47:263–292, 1979.
E. Kalai and E. Lehrer. Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica, 61
(5):1019–1045, 1993.
G.A. Kaminka and I. Frenkel. Integration of coordination mechanisms in the BITE
multi-robot architecture. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Robotics
and Automation, pages 2859–2866, 2007.
M. Kearns, Y. Mansour, and A.Y. Ng. A sparse sampling algorithm for near-optimal
planning in large Markov decision processes. Machine Learning, 49(2-3):193–208,
2002.
J.R. Koza. Genetic programming: On the programming of computers by means of
natural selection. The MIT Press, 1992.
H.W. Kuhn. Extensive games and the problem of information. Contributions to the
Theory of Games, 2(28):193–216, 1953.
K.G. Larsen and A. Skou. Bisimulation through probabilistic testing. Information and
Computation, 94(1):1–28, 1991.
X.-L. Meng. Posterior predictive p-values. The Annals of Statistics, pages 1142–1160,
1994.
John H. Nachbar. Beliefs in repeated games. Econometrica, 73(2):459–480, 2005.
120 Bibliography
J.F. Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950.
B. Ng, C. Meyers, K. Boakye, and J. Nitao. Towards applying interactive POMDPs to
real-world adversary modeling. In Proceedings of the 22nd Innovative Applications
of Artificial Intelligence Conference, pages 1814–1820, 2010.
A. O’Hagan and T. Leonard. Bayes estimation subject to uncertainty about parameter
constraints. Biometrika, 63(1):201–203, 1976.
A. Rapoport and M. Guyer. A taxonomy of 2×2 games. General Systems: Yearbook of
the Society for General Systems Research, 11:203–214, 1966.
B. Rathnasabapathy, P. Doshi, and P. Gmytrasiewicz. Exact solutions of interactive
POMDPs using behavioral equivalence. In Proceedings of the 5th International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 1025–1032, 2006.
D.B. Rubin. Bayesianly justifiable and relevant frequency calculations for the applied
statistician. The Annals of Statistics, 12(4):1151–1172, 1984.
D. Ryabko and B. Ryabko. On hypotheses testing for ergodic processes. In Proceedings
of IEEE Information Theory Workshop, pages 281–283, 2008.
S. Sen, S. Airiau, and R. Mukherjee. Towards a Pareto-optimal solution in general-sum
games. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Joint Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 153–160, 2003.
L.S. Shapley. Stochastic games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America, 39(10):1095, 1953.
F. Southey, M. Bowling, B. Larson, C. Piccione, N. Burch, D. Billings, and C. Rayner.
Bayes’ bluff: Opponent modelling in poker. In Proceedings of the 21st Conference
on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 550–558, 2005.
T. Steffens. Feature-based declarative opponent-modelling. In RoboCup 2003: Robot
Soccer World Cup VII, pages 125–136. Springer, 2004.
P. Stone and S. Kraus. To teach or not to teach? decision making under uncertainty in
ad hoc teams. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 117–124, 2010.
Bibliography 121
P. Stone, G.A. Kaminka, S. Kraus, and J.S. Rosenschein. Ad hoc autonomous agent
teams: Collaboration without pre-coordination. In Proceedings of the 24th AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 1504–1509, 2010.
G. Sukthankar, R.P. Goldman, C. Geib, D.V. Pynadath, and H.H. Bui. Plan, Activity,
and Intent Recognition: Theory and Practice. Morgan Kaufmann, 2014.
R.S. Sutton and A.G. Barto. Reinforcement learning: An introduction. The MIT Press,
1998.
M. Tambe. Towards flexible teamwork. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 7:
83–124, 1997.
H.J. van den Herik, H.H.L.M. Donkers, and P.H.M. Spronck. Opponent modelling and
commercial games. In Proceedings of the IEEE 2005 Symposium on Computational
Intelligence and Games, pages 15–25, 2005.
A. Vehtari and J. Ojanen. A survey of Bayesian predictive methods for model assessment,
selection and comparison. Statistics Surveys, 6:142–228, 2012.
W.A. Wagenaar. Generation of random sequences by human subjects: A critical survey
of literature. Psychological Bulletin, 77(1):65–72, 1972.
C.J.C.H. Watkins and P. Dayan. Q-learning. Machine learning, 8(3):279–292, 1992.
J. Wendler and J. Bach. Recognizing and predicting agent behavior with case based
reasoning. RoboCup 2003: Robot Soccer World Cup VII, pages 729–738, 2004.
M. Wooldridge. An introduction to multiagent systems. John Wiley & Sons, 2nd edition,
2009.
H.P. Young. Strategic Learning and Its Limits. Oxford University Press, 2004.
Y. Yue, Y. Gao, O. Chapelle, Y. Zhang, and T. Joachims. Learning more powerful test
statistics for click-based retrieval evaluation. In Proceedings of the 33rd International
ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval,
pages 507–514, 2010.
